A peer-review mechanism for the biological and toxin weapons convention by Revill, James
At the Seventh Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons 
Convention (BTWC) in December 2011, a debate was initiated on the 
potential of developing a peer review system to build confidence in 
the implementation of the Convention. Peer review has precedent in 
the activities of a number of international organizations, although the 
objectives, format, participants, and structure of the mechanisms vary. This 
report takes the debate forward by looking at what peer review is, how it 
works elsewhere, how it could be applied in the context of the BTWC, 
what would be required to move forward, and what possible advantages or 
disadvantages a peer-review process would confer to the BTWC in light of 
the Convention’s recent history.
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FOREWORD
Few issues are more sensitive than that of verification of the Biological and 
Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). Since the collapse of the protocol 
discussions in 2001, there has been much debate as to how—in the 
absence of agreement among states parties—to strengthen compliance 
with the BTWC regime. Two intersessional processes have generated 
valuable ideas on possible steps to increase confidence and compliance. 
One concrete measure that has been suggested is that of a peer-review 
mechanism. 
While common in academia, the utility or application of peer review 
for a disarmament treaty is perhaps not evident at first glance. This 
study explores the potential application of a peer-review mechanism 
for the BTWC through an initial survey of five distinct peer-review 
mechanisms already in use in the international community. With a deeper 
understanding of the purpose, structure, and mechanisms of peer-review 
processes, disarmament practitioners will be in a better position to discuss 
whether peer review might be one step to strengthen the BTWC regime.
The study is based on a definition of peer review for international 
organizations published by the Legal Directorate of the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The OECD 
characterizes peer review as “the systematic examination and assessment 
of the performance of a State by other States, with the ultimate goal of 
helping the reviewed State improve its policy making, adopt best practices, 
and comply with established standards and principles”.
Given the dual-use nature of biological agents, and the vast amount 
of biological research conducted by academic institutions and the 
private sector, such a process could be envisioned also to include non-
governmental stakeholders. Such “outside” reviewers might be able to 
provide insights about, for example, best practice in industry laboratories 
that might not otherwise be considered. 
It should be stressed that such a peer-review process would need to be 
highly consultative and cooperative. Rather than involving inspections or 
audits primarily aimed at fault-finding, the process would be designed as a 
collaborative method of assisting states in improving their compliance and 
their practices. 
xDespite the controversy over verification of the BTWC, there is widespread 
support for strengthening the regime, building confidence, and monitoring 
compliance. The concept of peer review is one potentially creative 
solution. 
UNIDIR prides itself on making practical contributions to the problems 
vexing the multilateral disarmament community, and has a long history of 
work aimed at strengthening the BTWC. Indeed, the suggestion of a peer-
review mechanism being of relevance to the BTWC regime first appeared 
in UNIDIR’s journal Disarmament Forum, in an article by Richard Lennane, 
Director of the BTWC Implementation Support Unit. The idea was picked 
up by a BTWC member state, France, which put the idea forward in a 
working paper at the Seventh Review Conference in December 2011. 
Noting the unfamiliarity of the topic to many in our field, UNIDIR has 
produced this study—which will undoubtedly generate further discussion 
among states and may lead to further contributions by UNIDIR on peer 
review in the future.
Theresa Hitchens
Director
UNIDIR
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
At the Seventh Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons 
Convention (BTWC) in December 2011, a working paper submitted by 
France sought to initiate debate on the potential of developing a peer-
review system for the BTWC to build confidence in the implementation of 
the Convention. The concept of peer review has precedent in the activities 
of a number of other international organizations, yet the objectives, format, 
participants, and structure of peer-review mechanisms vary. Accordingly, 
this study seeks to take forward this debate by looking at what peer review 
is, how it works elsewhere, how it could be applied in the context of the 
BTWC, what would be required to move forward, and what possible 
advantages or disadvantages a peer-review process would confer to the 
BTWC in light of the Convention’s recent history.
The proposal for some form of peer review has to be examined in the 
context of the BTWC, which remains devoid of effective mechanisms to 
assess compliance, despite a decade of looking at a set of measures to 
strengthen confidence in the Convention through the development of a 
protocol that collapsed in 2001. Since then the BTWC has undergone 
two intersessional processes that were unquestionably valuable, yet 
fell short of the expectations of more ambitious states parties. As states 
parties begin a third intersessional process following a hard fought, yet 
ultimately disappointing result from the Seventh Review Conference, the 
danger is that the high-level attention required to nurture the BTWC may 
begin to diminish. The success or failure of arms control and disarmament 
regimes depends on the actions of their states parties, which need to 
cultivate the regimes and ensure their continued relevance in changing 
scientific and political contexts. When looking for measures to strengthen 
the Convention, rather than reigniting old debates over the protocol, 
it is perhaps time to look at what steps could improve confidence in 
compliance outside of those politically sensitive areas. One means to 
achieve this could be to address compliance with the obligations of the 
BTWC through a systematic review of the performance of a state party by 
other states parties—in short, by adopting a peer-review process. 
Peer review has different meanings in different contexts. In academia, this 
is widely used to refer to a process of “evaluation of research findings for 
xii
competence, significance, and originality by qualified experts”.1 However 
this is not the conceptualization of peer review that is being addressed 
here. Rather, the term peer review in the context of this study assumes 
a meaning that is particular to the practice of international organizations 
and has been defined by the Legal Directorate of the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) as “the systematic 
examination and assessment of the performance of a State by other States, 
with the ultimate goal of helping the reviewed State improve its policy 
making, adopt best practices, and comply with established standards and 
principles”.2
In this study, five peer-review mechanisms that fall within this definition are 
considered: the African Union’s African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM); 
the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) peer-review 
system; the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) peer-review mechanism on 
money laundering; the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Integrated 
Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) peer reviews; and the European Nuclear 
Safety Regulators Group (ENSREG) stress tests. These five mechanisms 
vary in detail considerably. Nevertheless, there are a number of common 
themes: 
Peer reviews are evaluations carried out by equals that function with • 
the objective of variously identifying deficiencies, showcasing and 
fostering best practice, sharing experiences, and improving individual 
and collective performance. They are not inspections or audits.
Peer reviews derive influence from the associated peer pressure and • 
scrutiny they generate, something that can be particularly effective 
when reviews are viewed as credible, contain a follow-on process, 
and are made publicly available.3 
Peer review requires the completion of some form of data collection • 
process in order to generate a baseline of data on which to carry out a 
review. Some mechanisms do this through a structured questionnaire, 
1 D. Benos et al., “The ups and downs of peer review”, Advances in Physiology 
Education, vol. 31, no. 2, 2007.
2 F. Pagani, Peer Review: A Tool for Co-operation and Change—An Analysis of 
an OECD Working Method, OECD document SG/LEG(2002)1, 11 September 
2002, para. 3.
3 K.L. Gardner, “Fighting terrorism the FATF way”, Global Governance, vol. 13, 
no. 3, 2007.
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while others require a reviewed state to demonstrate that it has 
considered various criteria.
Baseline data are in turn gauged against some form of standard or • 
principle by a team of reviewers; however, most peer-review systems 
recognize that no “one size fits all”, and take into consideration the 
national context, thus ensuring flexibility and “scalability” in the review 
process. 
Peer review can be applied in a modular fashion whereby a state can • 
select areas that warrant particular attention for review. 
Peer review ensures some form of consultation and clarification • 
process takes place in which the reviewers can check what has been 
submitted, clarify any ambiguities, and examine the situation from 
different perspectives.
Peer-review mechanisms often work with a broad range of stakeholders • 
from the national to the local level. 
Finally, peer-review mechanisms often include on-site visits with both • 
staff interviews and observations of practices in order to understand 
the implementation of certain measures in practice. 
As there is a diversity of relevant peer-review mechanisms, this study, in 
considering how best a peer-review mechanism might be integrated into 
the BTWC, develops a modular approach in order to demonstrate the 
benefits that are potentially available to the states parties.
A modular approach would offer states parties a basic “peer-review 
package” that would most logically focus on implementation of national 
legislation and regulations. However, depending on the level of ambition 
and enthusiasm, states parties could select additional modules related to, 
inter alia, export control provision; biosecurity and biosafety provision; 
outreach, codes, education and engagement; disease outbreak detection 
and response capacity; international cooperation and assistance; or 
oversight mechanisms.
Under this model, a review would start with the collection and collation of 
relevant data, which would be assessed by small teams of reviewers with 
relevant expertise who were nominated by states parties and selected on 
a geographically representative basis. Taking the basic legislation-focused 
package as an example, such a team would be tasked with conducting an 
assessment of whether all key aspects of legislation are in place and also 
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whether these have been effectively implemented using agreed criteria 
(drawn up from past intersessional discussions) for consideration. 
If other modules were required and states sought a more ambitious 
review, additional components could be requested that could provide an 
increasingly comprehensive assessment of implementation. This process 
could be augmented through an activity report from others engaged 
in the life sciences at the local level, such as biosafety officers working 
in academia and industry, to provide information on what the situation 
is locally. This could be followed by a series of transparency visits to key 
facilities selected by the state party being reviewed, conducted by a team 
of peers nominated by participating states parties. The visits would allow 
the team to speak with staff and observe certain procedures to see how 
implementation works in practice and then share best practices and lessons 
learned—a process that is similar to a number of contemporary industry 
practices such as registration to ISO 14001 or the process of certification 
for OHSAS (Occupational Health and Safety Assessment Series) 18001.
After analysis, reviewers and representatives of the reviewed state party 
could engage in a process of consultation and clarification that would 
seek to arrive at agreement on a draft report. This would include a factual 
description of measures in place, an analysis of whether they were fit for 
purpose, and, if required, recommendations and comments. In the case 
where serious deficiencies were identified the report could include a time 
frame for implementation of recommendations and a plan for the provision 
of the necessary support and capacity-building required to implement the 
recommendations. This could be achieved through using the database 
agreed upon at the Seventh Review Conference and in turn could help 
stimulate the use of the database and open up channels of assistance for 
all states parties (not just those subject to a peer-review process). The next 
stage would be to present the findings at a meeting of states parties when 
the reviewers, states parties, and other interested parties could explore, 
clarify, and further resolve ambiguities, and share lessons learned. The 
additional advantage of an open plenary session would be to generate peer 
pressure to fulfil any recommendations and to provide an additional layer 
of public scrutiny that may encourage states to undertake recommended 
actions. 
The peer-review approach is one possible step forward that goes 
considerably beyond and builds upon United Nations Security Council 
resolution 1540 activities and, assuming adoption of a constructive and 
ambitious approach via a number of different modules, could provide 
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greater transparency, a cooperative approach to clarification of a state 
party’s implementation submission, an enhanced understanding of how 
national security and safety rules and regulations operate in practice, 
an awareness-raising and best-practice sharing process for academia 
and industry, and a greater understanding of the extent of international 
cooperation and best practice in such cooperation. The process of 
presenting the outcome to a meeting of states parties could lead to 
assistance in capacity-building and providing the resources for a state party 
to carry out concrete actions as appropriate to improve the situation—
something that could stimulate the use of the database facility and open 
channels for the delivery of assistance to all states parties, not just those 
under peer review. Such an approach is attractive as many of the necessary 
components can readily be developed from what already exists. Moreover, 
by providing what Lennane calls “A structured and systematic means of 
providing an increased level of assurance that states parties are complying 
with the … obligations of the convention”,4 peer review would be a step 
towards strengthening implementation of the Convention and enhancing 
its effectiveness.
This study sets out a number of prerequisites for any peer-review system, 
including:
The nomination of an objective, expert • set of “peers” to produce a 
credible review; this is essential if reports and recommendations are to 
be taken as soundly based. 
The development of a • baseline of information from which to conduct 
a review. Clearly confidence-building measures are a useful starting 
point although additional documentation (such as copies of national 
laws and regulations) will be required in the reviewer’s language. A 
questionnaire tool could facilitate information gathering in this regard.
Some • principles, criteria, or standards from which to conduct an 
objective review. There is a wealth of material from the intersessional 
processes and regional standards that could be employed, although 
the peer-review system will need to take into consideration the context 
and thus be “scalable” and “adaptable” enough to be applicable to 
the range of participating states. 
4 R. Lennane, “Verification for the BTWC: if not the protocol, then 
what?”, Disarmament Forum, no. 1, UNIDIR, 2011, p. 41.
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Summary of the modular approach to a
BTWC peer-review mechanism
Objective Voluntary evaluation of the implementation of the 
Convention by a state party
Basic module Legislative and regulatory environment
Additional 
modules
Implementation and enforcement of legislation• 
Export-control provision• 
Biosecurity and biosafety provision• 
Outreach, codes, education, and engagement• 
Disease outbreak detection and response capacity• 
International cooperation and assistance• 
Oversight mechanisms• 
Reviewers
The basic module would require a small team of legal 
experts nominated as representatives of states parties. 
The team would need to be selected on the basis of 
language, experience, and the type of legal system 
being assessed.
Depending on whether additional modules were 
selected, a team comprising the following areas 
of expertise could be required: customs; law 
enforcement, biosecurity and biosafety; and public 
health and BTWC policy. The team would need to be 
nominated by states parties on the basis of expertise 
but also language and geographical representation. 
Process
1. The preparatory phase
2. On-site transparency visit
3. Analysis phase
4. The consultation and clarification phase
5. Plenary discussion and publication of report
6. Follow-up
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A peer-review process will need clear • incentives for participation—
and such incentives will need to be delivered as agreed. One option 
could be to link a review process to the delivery of any resources 
necessary to rectify any gaps identified, something that could perhaps 
be mutually beneficial in linking up with other activities, such as the 
database. 
A credible • follow-up process will need to be designed to ensure that 
any agreed recommendations are carried out. 
Most importantly, any peer-review process will require • political will to 
proceed. A review of statements and working papers submitted to the 
Seventh Review Conference in 2011 shows that there is already some 
support for aspects of a peer-review process. Rather than seeking a 
multilaterally negotiated route to a peer-review mechanism, a smaller 
group of like-minded states parties that are committed—and willing to 
be reviewed themselves—could pilot such a peer-review process and 
report back to the states parties.
This study concludes by identifying a number of advantages and 
disadvantages of a peer-review process and recommends that one 
useful preliminary step that states parties could undertake would be 
communication between counterparts in agencies with experience of peer-
review mechanisms in other areas to gain an understanding of whether 
participation in such existing peer-review processes generates sufficient 
benefits to offset the costs in time and resources. This study concludes 
that the advantages would outweigh the disadvantages and a peer-review 
system that looks at broad implementation of the Convention could be 
an attractive and effective way of moving the overall confidence in the 
Convention forward through a systematic review of national compliance 
of individual states parties with their obligations, thereby enhancing 
international confidence in the Convention.
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Summary of the advantages and disadvantages
of the modular approach
Advantages
Improved transparency • 
Provides a safe space for • 
clarification and consultation
Structured mechanism for • 
sharing best practice
Provides an applied • 
mechanism to enhance 
national implementation
Provides a flexible and • 
“scalable” assessment 
mechanism
Potential to support outreach • 
and engagement with 
academia and industry
Peer pressure could • 
encourage improvement in 
implementation
It would not require new • 
structures
It is not verification• 
Disadvantages
Any mechanisms will require • 
resources and political will
States may be reluctant to • 
expose themselves to scrutiny
The process may serve as a • 
distraction from the central 
question of compliance with 
the prohibitions embodied in 
the Convention 
It is not verification• 
1INTRODUCTION
At the 2011 Seventh Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin 
Weapons Convention (BTWC), a working paper submitted by France 
proposed the idea of developing a peer-review system for the BTWC. 
The working paper, which was submitted to raise “some points for further 
discussion”, outlined a mechanism intended “to provide for an assessment 
of the implementation of the Convention, thereby bolstering confidence 
among States parties”.1 In accordance with the French vision, a peer-
review mechanism: 
would provide a framework for mutual assessments of the 
implementation of standards based on the common understandings 
reached during the intersessional process. These assessments could be 
based on a detailed, predetermined methodology and could include 
an analysis of States’ written statements, as well as country visits. The 
assessment team could comprise State-appointed national experts and 
possibly representatives of the Implementation Support Unit. ... The 
mechanism would function on a voluntary basis, with all assessments 
being initiated at the request of the State concerned.2
The French proposal followed an earlier suggestion by the Head of the 
BTWC’s Implementation Support Unit, Richard Lennane, in the journal 
Disarmament Forum: 
Biodefence is the area where the line between permitted and 
prohibited activities is finest and where there is most potential for legal 
activities to be converted to illegal ones literally overnight. … A good 
case can therefore be made for a higher level of scrutiny, and higher 
standards of transparency and communication, including some level of 
on-site access by external monitors. 
… 
The question is, of course, how to do it in the absence of a legal 
framework and an independent monitoring organization. The most 
immediately tractable approach would probably be an informal 
(essentially voluntary) arrangement of peer review among States Parties 
1 France, A Peer Review Mechanism for the Biological Weapons Convention: 
Enhancing Confidence in National Implementation and International 
Cooperation, document BWC/CONF.VII/WP.28, 13 December 2011.
2 Ibid., paras. 5–6.
2with declared biodefence programmes. These governments could take 
turns to visit each others’ biodefence facilities, in accordance with a 
mutually agreed schedule and procedures, and compare what they 
see and hear with what has been declared.3 
The concept of peer review has thus gathered some interest in the context 
of the BTWC; moreover it is a concept that has precedent in a number of 
different international organizations albeit with very different objectives. 
For example, the African Union operates the voluntary African Peer Review 
Mechanism “to promote and re-enforce high standards of governance”4 
whereas the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) conducts peer 
assessments of nuclear regulatory frameworks. 
Yet it remains unclear what peer review is in the context of international 
organizations, how a peer-review mechanism could function in the BTWC, 
or indeed what the advantages and disadvantages of such a system would 
be in the context of the BTWC. Accordingly, this study seeks to look at 
what peer review is, how it works, and how it could be applied in the 
context of the BTWC and whether this could be a useful step forward in 
the evolution of the Convention. 
After providing a short overview of the BTWC and its development, the 
study proceeds with an analysis of how the concept of peer review has 
been applied in other fields, specifically the fields of governance, financial 
systems, nuclear regulation, and development aid. The purpose of this 
section is to illustrate the diversity of approaches to peer review in the 
international system and the differences between the “peers”, structures, 
and mandates of different systems in order to inform conceptualization of 
a peer-review mechanism in the BTWC context. 
The second section maps the concept of a peer-review mechanism onto 
the BTWC, taking into consideration the technical and political feasibility 
in the multilateral context of the Convention. Because of the diverse nature 
of peer-review mechanisms, this section develops a modular approach to 
a BTWC peer-review mechanism, which would contain a core package 
of measures with a series of optional extras that could be employed in 
accordance with the varying degrees of ambition of states parties. The 
penultimate section addresses some of the prerequisites for any effective 
3 R. Lennane, “Verification for the BTWC: if not the protocol, then what?”, 
Disarmament Forum, no. 1, UNIDIR, 2011, p. 46.
4 See “African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM)”, <www.nepad.org/
economicandcorporategovernance/african-peer-review-mechanism/about>.
3peer-review process drawing on the experience of peer review in other 
areas. The final section concludes with an evaluation of the costs and 
benefits of a BTWC peer-review system in light of the Convention’s recent 
history and contemporary trajectory. 
THE BTWC
Proposals for some form of peer-review mechanism for the BTWC have 
to be understood in the context of a disarmament agreement that lacks 
any mechanism to effectively determine compliance, despite a decade 
of discussion on strengthening the Convention through negotiation of a 
protocol over the course of the 1990s. This process began with the work 
of the “Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts to identify and examine 
potential verification measures from a scientific and technical standpoint” 
(known as VEREX), which was the product of compromise at the Third 
Review Conference in 1991, and continued through the politically 
orientated Ad Hoc Group (AHG) process that was initiated following the 
convening of a Special Conference in 1994. Although the work of the 
AHG appeared to be making progress and picked up the pace following 
the Fourth Review Conference in 1996, by 2000 progress appeared 
to decelerate with political stances concretizing in key issue areas. This 
process ultimately collapsed in 2001, a step that not only moved states 
parties back to square one, but also ushered states parties into a climate of 
frustration and uncertainty at a time in which remarkable changes in the 
capacities and geography of life science research were occurring.5
In the decade since the collapse of negotiations on a verification protocol, 
the BTWC has evolved through a series of intersessional meetings focused 
on specific aspects of the implementation of the Convention. The first 
intersessional meeting was constructed as a means to salvage some form 
of follow-up process to the failed AHG that would keep states around 
the table and talking about BTWC-related issues. The mandate contained 
neither power to negotiate, nor any scope to make binding decisions;6 
instead it provided for a series of expert and state party meetings to discuss 
and promote common understanding and effective action on:
5 P. Slevin, “U.S. drops bid to strengthen germ warfare accord”, Washington 
Post, 19 September 2002.
6 J. Littlewood, The Biological Weapons Convention: A Failed Revolution, 2005, 
p. 224. 
4i. the adoption of necessary national measures to implement the 
prohibitions set forth in the Convention, including the enactment 
of penal legislation; 
ii. national mechanisms to establish and maintain the security and 
oversight of pathogenic microorganisms and toxins; 
iii. enhancing international capabilities for responding to, investigating 
and mitigating the effects of cases of alleged use of biological or 
toxin weapons or suspicious outbreaks of disease; 
iv. strengthening and broadening national and international 
institutional efforts and existing mechanisms for the surveillance, 
detection, diagnosis and combating of infectious diseases affecting 
humans, animals, and plants; 
v. the content, promulgation, and adoption of codes of conduct for 
scientists.7
Under the circumstances, the first intersessional process was an unexpected 
success8 and there was sufficient support at the Sixth Review Conference 
to continue this process through a consensus agreement to undertake a 
second intersessional process with similar mandate to discuss, and promote 
common understanding and effective action on:
i. Ways and means to enhance national implementation, including 
enforcement of national legislation, strengthening of national 
institutions and coordination among national law enforcement 
institutions.
ii. Regional and sub-regional cooperation on implementation of the 
Convention.
iii. National, regional and international measures to improve biosafety 
and biosecurity, including laboratory safety and security of 
pathogens and toxins.
iv. Oversight, education, awareness raising, and adoption and/or 
development of codes of conduct with the aim of preventing misuse 
7 Fifth Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the 
Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological 
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, Final Document, 
document BWC/CONF.V/17, 2002, para. 18(a). 
8 Summary report of the Geneva Forum conference Meeting the Challenges of 
Reviewing the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, 9–10 March 2006, 
Glion, Switzerland.
5in the context of advances in bio-science and bio-technology 
research with the potential of use for purposes prohibited by the 
Convention.
v. With a view to enhancing international cooperation, assistance 
and exchange in biological sciences and technology for peaceful 
purposes, promoting capacity building in the fields of disease 
surveillance, detection, diagnosis, and containment of infectious 
diseases: (1) for States Parties in need of assistance, identifying 
requirements and requests for capacity enhancement; and (2) from 
States Parties in a position to do so, and international organizations, 
opportunities for providing assistance related to these fields.
vi. Provision of assistance and coordination with relevant organizations 
upon request by any State Party in the case of alleged use 
of biological or toxin weapons, including improving national 
capabilities for disease surveillance, detection and diagnosis and 
public health systems.9 
These sets of meetings have unquestionably had a number of benefits. 
First, the process has enabled states parties to discuss what were 
comparatively new and novel concepts, such as “biosecurity”, in an 
open manner devoid of the strictures of a negotiating climate. Second, 
the intersessional processes have enabled the BTWC to pioneer a much 
more flexible, decentralized, “networked” approach to arms control and 
disarmament.10 In circumstances where dealing with the challenge of 
biological weapons requires a variety of activities at a range of different 
levels from the individual to the international, such a network-based 
model is important. Third, from a practical perspective, meetings such as 
the 2005 meetings on codes of conduct for scientists require input from 
scientific stakeholders and outreach to those that codes would seek to 
influence. The intersessional processes have been good in this regard and 
generated unprecedented levels of civil society participation in meetings 
over the course of the last decade. Finally, two intersessional periods have 
to some extent allowed the wounds from 2001 to heal. 
9 Sixth Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the 
Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological 
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, Final Document, 
document BWC/CONF.VI/6, 2006, part III, para. 7(a).
10 P. Millett, “Why the 2011 BTWC RevCon might not be business as usual”, 
Disarmament Forum, no. 1, UNIDIR, 2011.
6Yet for all its success, the intersessional period scores less highly in terms 
of generating effective action and concrete results, leading many to 
conclude that the process that emerged from 2002 had run its course and 
it was time for a change in intersessional activity after the Seventh Review 
Conference.11 For example, the United States remarked that “to address 
increasingly challenging issues and develop more concrete outcomes 
and products, the intersessional process needs to evolve”;12 whereas a 
collective of states, including Australia, Canada, and Japan, suggested the 
intersessional process could “be improved and would be more adaptable 
to our changing world with Working Groups”.13 Yet other states referred 
variously to improving or enhancing the Convention. For example, the 
Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) spoke of the importance of “work towards 
strengthening and improving the effectiveness and implementation of this 
Convention”;14 the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) referred 
to the need to “increase the effectiveness of the Convention’s regime and 
agree on a set of concrete measures to implement it”.15 
However, despite high expectations for the Seventh Review Conference 
to deliver a more substantive agenda through the creation of BTWC 
working groups and an expanded Implementation Support Unit (ISU), the 
meeting was a hard-fought three weeks that ultimately failed to meet the 
expectations of those states parties seeking a more ambitious outcome. 
Instead it resulted in something much more modest,16 principally 
through agreement to three standing agenda items addressing national 
implementation, science and technology, and peaceful cooperation. 
11 Certainly this is apparent in several working papers submitted in advance of 
the Seventh Review Conference on the BTWC website.
12 United States of America, The Next Intersessional Process, 2011, para. 3, 
<www.opbw.org/rev_cons/7rc/BWC_CONF.VII_WP_US_E.pdf>. 
13 Canada (joint statement of Japan, Australia, Canada, the Republic of Korea, 
Switzerland, Norway, and New Zealand), 5 December 2011, <www.opbw.
org/rev_cons/7rc/BWC_CONF.VII_Statement_JACKSNNZ_E.pdf>. 
14 Cuba (on behalf of the Group of the Non-Aligned Movement and Other 
States Parties to the BWC), 5 December 2011, para. 5, <www.opbw.org/
rev_cons/7rc/BWC_CONF.VII_Statement_Cuba-NAM_S.pdf> 
15 Belarus (on behalf of the member states of the CSTO), 5 December 2011, 
<www.opbw.org/rev_cons/7rc/BWC_CONF.VII_Statement_Belarus-CSTO_E.
pdf>. 
16 J. Revill, Workshop Report, Deconstructing the Final Document of the BWC 
Seventh Review Conference, Harvard Sussex Program, University of Sussex, 
8 March 2012. 
7The success or failure of arms control and disarmament agreements rests 
on the actions of their states parties. In acceding to a treaty, states parties 
commit to undertaking a series of measures to implement such agreements, 
a process that by its very nature places a number of constraints on a state’s 
freedom to act but also demands “tending”, not just in its construction, 
but over time and in response to the evolving geostrategic context.17 This 
requires sustained commitment; as Brad Roberts has stated: 
Even among the best intentioned of parties to a treaty, there is always 
the difficult task of implementing treaty commitments and managing 
the inevitable uncertainties that arise and the complications caused by 
the passage of time. Tending to such implementation issues requires a 
steadiness of purpose not always found in governments and an ability 
to capture the attention of senior political figures even when they see 
few or no benefits to be reaped.18
To date, states parties appear to have managed to maintain interest in 
tending the BTWC, suggesting that, as McLeish has stated, each “continues 
to believe that the benefits they enjoy as being party to this treaty outweigh 
any negative obligations and costs”.19 However, in light of the failure to 
conclude a more substantive outcome over the last two decades, there is 
a real danger that high-level attention will drift away from the Convention 
and states will be disinclined to expend energy on activities that are merely 
“tinkering at the edges”.20 To prevent such a drift, one frequently suggested 
proposal is a return to the heavily bracketed rolling text of the AHG21 or 
the Chairman’s Composite Text.22 While this remains one option (and it 
17 See C. Flowerree, “On tending arms-control agreements”, Washington 
Quarterly, vol. 13, no. 1, 1990. 
18 B. Roberts, Weapons Proliferation and World Order: After the Cold War, 1996, 
p. 319.
19 C. McLeish, “Status quo or evolution: what next for the intersessional process 
of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention?”, Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientists, vol. 67, no. 3, 2011. 
20 J. Perry-Robinson, Near-Term Development of the Governance Regime for 
Biological and Chemical Weapons, Science and Technology Policy Research, 
University of Sussex, 4 November 2006, p. 16.
21 See, for example, AHG, Procedural Report of the Ad Hoc Group of the States 
Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production 
and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their 
Destruction, document BWC/AD HOC GROUP/55-1, 1 March 2001. 
22 AHG, Protocol to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, 
Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons 
8would certainly revitalize interest), it remains both a difficult and divisive 
course of action. Even should it be possible to resolve political difference 
and generate sufficient political will to proceed, much of the rolling text of 
the AHG, which has lain in stasis for the last decade (or three diplomatic 
rotations), would be difficult to pick up and run with as a whole because of 
the mass of political trade-offs already written into the document, the lack 
of institutional memory, and the profound changes in both the science and 
politics of the BTWC that have occurred since the early 1990s. 
In light of these difficulties, a more constructive approach could be to 
disaggregate verification and look at what steps could be achieved to 
improve confidence in compliance outside of those politically sensitive 
areas. To do this, it is perhaps worth looking first at what a state needs to 
do to be in compliance with the Convention. Lennane provides a useful 
starting point and has divided compliance into two categories: 
“compliance with the prohibitions of the convention”;• 23 that is, never 
in any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile, or otherwise 
acquire or retain biological weapons or means of delivery; and
“compliance with the positive obligations of the convention”;• 24 that 
is, to take active steps to prevent the transfer of biological weapons; 
to take any necessary national measures to prohibit and prevent the 
development, production, stockpiling, acquisition, or retention of 
biological weapons; to undertake to consult one another and to 
cooperate in solving any problems; to provide or support assistance 
and to promote, or at least avoid hindering, peaceful cooperation in 
the life sciences. 
As Lennane goes on to note, dealing with these issues requires two 
different approaches: the former requires some form of punishment, the 
latter requires incentives, assistance, and support.25 It also follows that 
the information necessary to be confident in the compliance of another 
state is different between these two aspects of compliance. The former 
essentially requires proving a negative and demonstrating—to varying 
degrees of scrutiny required to satisfy different states—the absence 
and on Their Destruction, document BWC/AD HOC GROUP/CRP.8, 3 April 
2001. 
23 R. Lennane, “Verification for the BTWC: if not the protocol, then what?”, 
Disarmament Forum, no. 1, UNIDIR, 2011, p. 41. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid.
9of efforts to develop, produce, stockpile, acquire, or retain biological 
weapons. The latter requires a different dataset in order to be confident 
in a state’s compliance with the positive obligations of the Convention: 
it requires information on what measures have been undertaken 
and whether they are effective in “prohibit[ing] and prevent[ing] the 
development, production, stockpiling, acquisition, or retention of the 
agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery specified in 
article I of the Convention” (BTWC, art. IV), or promoting cooperation in 
the “development and application of scientific discoveries in the field of 
bacteriology (biology) for prevention of disease” (BTWC, art. X). 
In seeking to develop new means to improve confidence in compliance 
and strengthen the Convention in the absence of a significant organizational 
capacity (or a legally binding verification regime) and in a manner that 
avoids opening the old wounds associated with the verification protocol, 
one pragmatic option could be to build on the precedent set elsewhere 
in the international system and develop a mechanism to conduct a 
“systematic examination and assessment of the performance of a State by 
other States, with the ultimate goal of helping the reviewed State improve 
its policy making, adopt best practices, and comply with established 
standards and principles”.26 This could enable an “increased level of 
assurance that States Parties are complying with the … obligations of the 
convention”27 and could take advantage of the flexible, network-based 
model that has emerged over the course of two intersessional processes. 
Moreover, rather than being dependent upon the successful agreement of a 
multilaterally negotiated, legally binding mechanism, peer review could be 
undertaken—at least in the first instance—through some form of collective 
of like-minded states; after all, compliance is a national undertaking and 
“begins at home”. While not a perfect solution, as the following sections 
indicate it is one approach that under the circumstances could enable 
the BTWC to be tended and through the provision of concrete benefits 
provide the steadiness of purpose required to sustain the health of the 
Convention and recapture the attention of senior political figures. 
26 F. Pagani, Peer Review: A Tool for Co-operation and Change—An Analysis of 
an OECD Working Method, OECD document SG/LEG(2002)1, 11 September 
2002, para. 3. 
27 R. Lennane, “Verification for the BTWC: if not the protocol, then what?”, 
Disarmament Forum, no. 1, UNIDIR, 2011, p. 41
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SURVEY OF PEER-REVIEW MECHANISMS
The concept of “peer review” is complex and assumes different meanings 
in different contexts. In academia the notion of peer review has its origins 
in eighteenth century medical science but is now widely used to refer to 
a process of “evaluation of research findings for competence, significance, 
and originality by qualified experts”.28 This can be done through a number 
of different methods (such as “blind” or “double blind” peer review) and 
is done to identify mistakes and provide feedback in order to improve (or 
reject) a manuscript prior to publication, or alternatively to assess project 
proposals for academic projects for originality, feasibility, and worth. While 
the process is far from perfect, nonetheless it has become embedded in 
academia and is perhaps the academic’s “least worst” quality control.29 
While there is perhaps much to be learned from looking at peer review 
in academia, this is not the conceptualization of peer review that is being 
addressed here. Rather the term peer review in the context of this study 
assumes a meaning particular to the practice of international organizations 
and has been defined—as stated above—as “the systematic examination 
and assessment of the performance of a State by other States, with the 
ultimate goal of helping the reviewed State improve its policy making, 
adopt best-practices, and comply with established standards and 
principles”.30 The process is frequently employed in international, regional, 
and like-minded organizations in a broad array of sectors ranging from good 
governance under the African Union’s African Peer Review Mechanism, 
to Environmental Performance Reviews under the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD),31 and relies not on 
the threat of sanctions or legal action to ensure compliance but on “peer 
pressure”, exerted through, inter alia, “formal recommendations and 
informal dialogue ... public scrutiny, comparisons, and ... the impact of all 
28 D. Benos et al., “The ups and downs of peer review”, Advances in Physiology 
Education, vol. 31, no. 2, 2007.
29 See D. Shatz, Peer Review: A Critical Inquiry, 2004. 
30 F. Pagani, Peer Review: A Tool for Co-operation and Change—An Analysis of 
an OECD Working Method, OECD document SG/LEG(2002)1, 11 September 
2002, para. 3.
31 See “The OECD Environmental Performance Reviews Programme: why?”, 
<www.oecd.org/site/peerreview/environmentalperformancereviews.htm>. 
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the above on domestic public opinion, national administrations and policy 
makers”.32
In order to illustrate how this process works and the means whereby 
peer review functions in the context of international organizations, the 
following section presents five different examples: the African Peer Review 
Mechanism, the OECD Development Assistance Committee peer-review 
system, the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering peer-review 
mechanism, the IAEA’s Integrated Regulatory Review Service peer reviews, 
and the European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group “stress tests”. 
AFRICAN PEER REVIEW MECHANISM 
The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) is a voluntary programme 
employed by the African Union in order “to promote and re-enforce high 
standards of governance”.33 More specifically: 
The primary purpose of the APRM is to foster the adoption of policies, 
standards and practices that lead to political stability, high economic 
growth, sustainable development and accelerated sub-regional and 
continental economic integration through sharing of experiences and 
reinforcement of successful and best practices, including identifying 
deficiencies and assessing the needs for capacity building.34
The process arose out of what has been described as “sluggish democratic 
transitions in Africa as well as the stagnation of African development in 
general”,35 and derives its original mandate from the documents that 
emerged from the Sixth Summit of the Heads of State and Government 
Implementation Committee of the New Partnership for Africa’s 
Development (NEPAD) in 2003, but specifically the memorandum of 
understanding on the APRM, which serves as the “accession document 
for the APRM”.36 The APRM review process concentrates on four key 
32 F. Pagani, Peer Review: A Tool for Co-operation and Change—An Analysis of 
an OECD Working Method, OECD document SG/LEG(2002)1, 11 September 
2002, para. 6.
33 See “African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM)”, <www.nepad.org/
economicandcorporategovernance/african-peer-review-mechanism/about>.
34 See “About APRM”, <http://aprm-au.org/about-aprm>. 
35 A.B. Chikwanha, The APRM: A Case Study in Democratic Institution Building?, 
ISS Paper 151, Institute for Security Studies, 2007. 
36 African Union, Guidelines for Countries to Prepare for and to Participate in the 
African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), 2003, para. 1(i). 
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indicators of good governance: democracy and good political governance, 
economic governance and management, corporate governance, and 
socioeconomic development. As of 2011, 30 states had voluntarily 
participated in the APRM,37 which requires an annual contribution from 
member states of US$ 100,000.38 The mechanism has provision for four 
specific types of review:
a “base” review, which is the first review carried out within 18 months • 
after a state becomes a member of the APRM;
a periodic review that takes place every two to four years;• 
a member state may, for its own reasons, request a review outside the • 
framework of the periodically mandated reviews; and
early signs of impending political and economic crisis in a member • 
state could also be sufficient cause for commissioning a review.39
A review (or APR) is conducted by a combination of three bodies: the 
“Panel of Eminent Persons” comprised of nominees of participating 
states and selected on the basis of “high moral stature and demonstrated 
commitment to the ideals of Pan-Africanism”40 in a manner that seeks to 
“reflect regional, gender and cultural balance”,41 a Secretariat that provides 
technical and administrative support to the APR Panel,42 and an APR 
Country Review Team.
Using this structure, a “base” review process is conducted over five 
stages and normally takes one year to complete, including a six-month 
37 These include Algeria, Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, the Congo, 
Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, 
Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome and 
Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, the Sudan, Togo, Uganda, the 
United Republic of Tanzania, and Zambia. See Communiqué Issued at the End 
of the Sixteenth Summit of the Committee of Heads of State and Government 
Participating in the African Peer Review Mechanism, 28 January 2012, 
<http://maep-ua.org//sites/default/files/16TH%20APR%20FORUM%20-%20
FINAL%20COMMUNIQUE.pdf>.
38 See “Frequently asked questions”, <http://aprm-au.org/faq>. 
39 See “About APRM”, <http://aprm-au.org/about-aprm>. 
40 See “APR Panel of Eminent Persons”, <http://aprm-au.org/apr-panel-eminent-
persons>.
41 See A. Shifa, African Peer Review Mechanism: Progress Update, APRM 
Secretariat, 19 May 2011. 
42 Ibid. 
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pause between recommendations being made (phase four) and the final 
report being published (phase five), in which the state under review is 
expected to rectify any shortcomings identified in the peer-review process. 
A description of the five stages is outlined below, but to summarize, the 
review consists of background preparatory research, a country visit lasting 
for roughly three weeks, the preparation of recommendations, an internal 
presentation and discussion of findings, and the public release of a report. 
THE FIVE STAGES OF AN APRM REVIEW43
Stage 1—Background research and draft plan of action
In the first stage, the APRM Secretariat along with the focal point of the 
state under review prepare an up-to-date assessment of the “political, 
economic and corporate governance and development environment in 
the country to be reviewed”.44 For base reviews this is normally done 
through the use of the APRM Country Self-Assessment Questionnaire.45 
The process serves to highlight key issues and provide context and is 
shared among partners. In this first phase the APR team is also selected 
and the work plan is agreed, while the state under review is expected to 
articulate a preliminary plan of action for improving governance “based 
on existing policies”.46
Stage 2—Country visit
In the second phase the APR team visits the country and engages with 
a wide range of stakeholders. For example, in the case of Kenya’s 
APRM visit the team consulted with the “National Governing Council, 
civil society organisations, media, political parties, academia and faith 
43 J. Cilliers, Peace and Security through Good Governance—A Guide to the 
NEPAD African Peer Review Mechanism, Occasional Paper 70, Institute for 
Security Studies, 2003. See also NEPAD Secretariat, African Peer Review 
Mechanism Organisation and Processes, 2003.
44 NEPAD Secretariat, African Peer Review Mechanism Organisation and Processes, 
2003, para. 7.4.
45 See APRM Secretariat, Revised Country Self-Assessment Questionnaire for the 
African Peer Review Mechanism, 2012, <http://aprm-au.org/sites/default/files/
Revised%20APRM%20Eng%20Questionnaire%206%20Aug%2012.pdf>. 
46 L.A. Jinadu, The African Peer Review Process in Nigeria, Open Society Initiative 
for West Africa, 2008, p. 5. 
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based and human rights organisations. Others included trade unions, 
women and youth groups, minorities, disadvantaged groups, persons 
with disabilities, persons living with HIV/AIDS, and associations of 
journalists”.47 Consultations are employed to clarify issues and “build 
national consensus on the way forward”.48
Stage 3—Preparation of APR team recommendations
In the third stage the country review report is prepared by the APR team 
on the basis of consultations and background information taking into 
consideration the preliminary plan of action. This report is then shared 
with the host government to ensure accuracy and allow the host state 
an opportunity to react and propose responses to outstanding issues. 
Government responses are appended to the APR team report.49 The self-
assessment report and the team report are then used to agree upon a 
plan of action “outlining policies and practices for implementation”.50
Stage 4—Presentation to the African Peer Review Forum
In the fourth stage the APRM Secretariat submits the review team’s report 
to the African Peer Review Forum. A notably additional component to 
this stage is identified in paragraph 24 of the “base” document for the 
APRM and is worth quoting at length: 
If the Government of the country in question shows a demonstrable 
will to rectify the identified shortcomings, then it will be incumbent 
upon participating Governments to provide what assistance they can, 
as well as to urge donor governments and agencies also to come to 
the assistance of the country reviewed. However, if the necessary 
political will is not forthcoming from the Government, the participating 
states should first do everything practicable to engage it in constructive 
dialogue, offering in the process technical and other appropriate 
assistance. If dialogue proves unavailing, the participating Heads of 
State and Government may wish to put the Government on notice 
of their collective intention to proceed with appropriate measures 
by a given date. The interval should concentrate the mind of the 
47 APRM Secretariat, Country Review Report of the Republic of Kenya, 2006, 
p. 9. 
48 L.A. Jinadu, The African Peer Review Process in Nigeria, Open Society Initiative 
for West Africa, 2008, p. 5.
49 See “Stages of APRM”, <http://new.uneca.org/aprm/StagesAPRM.aspx>. 
50 L.A. Jinadu, The African Peer Review Process in Nigeria, Open Society Initiative 
for West Africa, 2008, p. 5.
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Government and provide a further opportunity for addressing the 
identified shortcomings under a process of constructive dialogue. All 
considered, such measures should always be utilized as a last resort.51
It remains unclear exactly what punishment was envisaged in the term 
“appropriate measures”.
Stage 5—Public release and promulgation
In the last stage the findings are formally published and circulated to 
relevant organizations.
For the purpose of this study, three aspects of the APRM are of particular 
note. First, the APRM has developed a Country Self-Assessment 
Questionnaire designed: 
Firstly, to provide participating countries with a format that can serve as 
a checklist to determine whether the various stakeholders participating 
in the process have responded to their concerns. Secondly, as a 
convenient summary to provide an overview of the results of their own 
self-assessment processes.52
After some difficulties, a revised APRM questionnaire was issued in 2012, 
which provides an introduction to the APRM concept and terminology as 
well as guidelines for the completion of the document. 
Second, the APRM exercise is not limited to government participation; 
rather, it “includes the legislative and judicial branches of government as 
well as an assessment of the Private Sector, Civil Society and the Media in 
the areas of governance and socio-economic development”.53 
Remarkably, these voices are recorded in Country Review Reports. The 
report on Kenya, for example, states: 
Stakeholders complained about the continued disregard for their 
cultural identities as evidenced in a series of derogatory and insensitive 
51 African Union, The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), document 
AHG/235 (XXXVIII), 8 July 2002, annex II, para. 24. 
52 See APRM Secretariat, Revised Country Self-Assessment Questionnaire for the 
African Peer Review Mechanism, 2012, <http://aprm-au.org/sites/default/files/
Revised%20APRM%20Eng%20Questionnaire%206%20Aug%2012.pdf>.
53 APRM Secretariat, 2011 APRM Annual Report, 2012, p. 2. 
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political remarks about them and their region particularly at the higher 
political levels. 
…
Incidences were cited during the consultations with stakeholders in 
which prominent government officials either disobeyed courts orders 
or expressed an intention to disobey them. Non-enforcement of 
sanctions levied against such disregard is fostering an emerging culture 
of impunity.54
Third, it is notable that the APRM appears to offer both a carrot and a 
stick. Although the punitive response to “unavailing dialogue” remains 
unclear, the carrot is clearly identified in the form of provision of assistance 
and a commitment to urging donor governments and agencies to come to 
the assistance of the country reviewed. Unfortunately, even though there 
are a number of reports of “positive experience”55 related to the APRM, 
the delivery of these incentives for participation does not appear to have 
been forthcoming in all cases. One participant in an APRM lessons-learned 
meeting remarked: 
The truth is that a large number of countries got into Nepad and APRM 
because there was a promise of support and resources, and the APRM 
stood as a very good process to improve governance, and at the end 
of that process, there was a promise of resources. … But we should 
be clear that there is nothing at the end of the tunnel forthcoming in 
terms of resources under the Nepad programme as such. What the 
implication might be, that those countries that have not yet gone 
into the APRM, now realising that those that have gone into it and 
might not be benefiting, might, in fact, decide for their own sake, but 
prompted by this reality, to shy away from the APRM.56
The latter point is particularly poignant suggesting, as it does, that the 
failure to meet expectations and deliver the anticipated incentives that 
reviewed states envisage when signing up could dissuade others from 
participation in the future. 
54 APRM Secretariat, Country Review Report of the Republic of Kenya, 2006, 
pp. 65, 72. 
55 A.B. Chikwanha, The APRM: A Case Study in Democratic Institution Building?, 
ISS Paper 151, Institute for Security Studies, October 2007.
56 South African Institute of International Affairs, APRM Lessons Learned: Report 
on the SAIIA Conference For Civil Society, Practitioners and Researchers, 2006, 
p. 30, <http://saiia.org.za/images/upload/APRM%20Lessons%20Learnt.pdf>. 
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FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE PEER-REVIEW MECHANISM 
The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is an independent intergovernmental 
organization established in 1989 to “set standards and promote effective 
implementation of legal, regulatory and operational measures for 
combating money laundering, terrorist financing and other related threats 
to the integrity of the international financial system”.57 The FATF currently 
boasts a membership of 34 member jurisdictions and two regional 
organizations (the European Union and the Gulf Cooperation Council)58 
and membership is based on the size of the economy with members 
providing a “written commitment at the political level”.59 FATF funding 
comes from the OECD member states and the annual budget for 2012 
was US$ 3,371,848.60 
As part of the recently agreed 2012–2020 mandate the FATF is tasked with 
inter alia: 
Assessing and monitoring its Members, through “peer reviews” 
(“mutual evaluations”) and follow-up processes, to determine the 
degree of technical compliance, implementation and effectiveness of 
systems to combat money laundering and the financing of terrorism 
and proliferation; refining the standard assessment methodology and 
common procedures for conducting mutual evaluations and evaluation 
follow-up … .61
The FATF peer-review process, known as “mutual evaluation”, is designed 
to assess progress in the implementation of the recommendations of the 
FATF, specifically the 2003 “FATF 40 Recommendations” and the 2001 
“FATF IX Special Recommendations” on terrorist financing (together known 
as the “FATF 40 + 9 Recommendations”). The process thus evaluates: 
whether the necessary laws, regulations or other measures required 
under the essential criteria are in force and effect, that there has been 
a full and proper implementation of all the necessary measures, and 
57 See “Who we are”, <www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/aboutus>.
58 See “FATF members and observers”, <www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/aboutus/
membersandobservers>. 
59 See “FATF membership policy”, <www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/aboutus/
membersandobservers/fatfmembershippolicy.html>. 
60 FATF, Annual Report 2011–2012, 2012, p. 38. 
61 FATF, Financial Action Task Force Mandate (2012–2020), 2012, p. 2. 
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that the [anti-money laundering (AML) and combating the financing of 
terrorism (CFT)] system as implemented is effective.62
The FATF mutual evaluations are set to embark upon the fourth round 
of assessment in 2013 and guidance has been revised to accommodate 
changes in threat perceptions and to improve transparency. The mutual 
evaluation process is estimated at taking six or seven months and has a 
number of phases. An outline based on the 2009 FATF Process and 
Procedures report is presented below.
OVERVIEW OF THE FATF MUTUAL EVALUATION PROCEDURE 200963
Before the on-site visit
In preparation for the on-site visit a number of organizational factors 
need to be considered including a scheduling of meetings and visits and 
the collection and collation of materials, including relevant laws and 
the questionnaire. States to be assessed are obliged to download and 
complete the questionnaire two months prior to the on-site visit. The 
reply forms are an important part of the evaluation: 
The questionnaire format is intended to facilitate the preparation of 
a response, which can provide key information for the on-site visit 
and form the basis for the initial outline draft of the MER [Mutual 
Evaluation Report] to be prepared by the Secretariat. It does not ask 
detailed questions, but countries must set out fully how they meet 
each Methodology criterion.64
In the meantime, the Secretariat prepares a draft agenda and, with the 
FATF President, selects the assessor team, which is normally comprised 
of one legal expert, two financial experts, and one law enforcement 
expert. Individuals are selected from a list of assessors on the basis of 
their neutrality, background, language, experience with different legal 
systems, and jurisdictions. The Secretariat also converts the assessed 
state’s questionnaire reply into a draft outline of the report that includes 
62 FATF, Third Round of AML/CFT Mutual Evaluations: Process and Procedures, 
2009, p. 3. 
63 See ibid., annex 1. 
64 Ibid., p. 5. 
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issues that may need to be addressed. This is then provided to the 
assessor team. 
On-site visit
The on-site visit is described as the “best opportunity to clarify issues 
relating to the country’s AML/CFT system, and assessors need to be 
fully prepared to not only examine the laws, regulations, guidelines 
and institutional measures, but to also review the effectiveness of the 
system”.65 The on-site session requires a minimum of seven to eight days, 
with the overwhelming majority of the time spent with “representatives of 
the country”, including private sector representatives, which is described 
as an important part of the visit.66 
After the on-site visit
Assessors begin the process of finalizing a draft report for discussion at 
a plenary meeting. This process requires a number of iterations of the 
draft report as comments and drafts are passed among the relevant actors 
(specifically the Secretariat, the assessor team, and the state point of 
contact) and is subject to a strict schedule that is timed to ensure that the 
final draft is ready for the Expert Review Group (ERG) Process prior to the 
FATF Plenary. Failure on the part of the state to comply with the agreed 
deadlines can result in the deferment of the evaluation and/or a letter to 
the “relevant Minister in the country”.67 
Expert Review Group Process
The ERG meeting immediately precedes the FATF Plenary, and serves to 
“identify and highlight the main/key issues arising in each MER, as well as 
inconsistencies with other MERs with a view to enhance discussion and 
resolution of those issues at the Plenary in an equitable manner”.68 This 
ERG Process serves to add an extra layer of scrutiny of reports and brings 
together “experienced experts from different delegations, taking into 
account regional balance, and from different expertise (legal, financial, 
law enforcement)” who conduct a review in the presence of assessed 
state representatives and the assessment team.69 The discussion of the 
65 Ibid., p. 7.
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid., pp. 8–9.
68 Ibid., p. 9.
69 Ibid., p. 10.
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ERG is recorded and submitted to the Plenary70 along with a draft report 
that the assessors and assessed seek to agree upon (although this is not 
always possible). 
Plenary meeting
At the plenary session the assessor team presents its findings before the 
assessed state takes the floor to make an opening statement. The plenary 
then discusses the report, focusing initially on issues raised at the ERG 
meeting. The plenary then seeks to agree language for the final report 
and any follow-up measures required before its adoption (or in some 
cases defer adoption and agree to discuss further). 
Publication and other procedures following the plenary
After the plenary’s adoption of the report, other minor details are ironed 
out through a further iterative process of checking before the report is 
sent for publication. The procedure is that “All mutual evaluation reports 
and executive summaries are to be published, and this will be done at 
the time of or soon after the Plenary, thus giving timely publicity to an 
important part of the FATF’s work”.71
Follow-up process
The FATF system relies on what Gardner describes as “graduated peer 
pressure on noncomplying members”72 and there are three types of 
follow-up processes under the FATF system. Under the first, states that 
have only minor requirements agree to update the FATF with a report on 
developments no later than two years after the plenary meeting. Under 
the second, the “Regular Follow-up” process, which occurs when there 
are “significant deficiencies in the country’s AML/CFT system”, a state is 
required to implement a series of measures agreed in the plenary and 
report back in no less than two years or in accordance with a “more 
expedited timetable” in certain circumstances.73 Finally in cases where 
an “Enhanced Follow-up” is deemed necessary, a number of graduated 
steps are applied ranging from a letter or a high-level mission to highlight 
70 Ibid., p. 9.
71 Ibid., p. 11.
72 K.L. Gardner, “Fighting terrorism the FATF way”, Global Governance, vol. 13, 
no. 3, 2007, p. 333.
73 FATF, Third Round of AML/CFT Mutual Evaluations: Process and Procedures, 
2009, p. 12.
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certain issues, to “issuing a formal FATF statement to the effect that 
the member jurisdiction is insufficiently in compliance with the FATF 
Recommendations”, or suspending or terminating FATF membership.74 
Although some have criticized the methodology of the FATF as being 
“skewed towards measuring legal frameworks, in minute detail and great 
length”,75 a number of other assessments are highly positive, and several 
aspects of the FATF mutual evaluations are of particular note. First, as with 
the APRM, the FATF process includes a questionnaire intended to provide 
the necessary information required to inform the on-site visit; however, as 
the guidelines indicate, “It does not ask detailed questions, but countries 
must set out fully how they meet each Methodology criterion”.76 In this 
regard the FATF process is a performance evaluation rather than a checklist. 
A second point that relates to the above is that the mutual assessments 
are scalable, in the sense that there is no one-size-fits-all approach—
rather the focus is on what works. As the guidance notes, “Assessors must 
be cognisant that different countries may adopt different approaches to 
meeting the FATF standards, and so need to be open and flexible, and 
seek to avoid narrow comparisons with their own national solutions”.77
Third, the assessor team is selected on the basis of a number of factors 
including language, experience, and the type of legal system being 
assessed. Expert assessors normally form groups of four, comprised typically 
of one legal expert, two financial experts, and a law enforcement officer, 
and are selected from a list on the basis of attributes and neutrality. As the 
FATF guidance notes, a “list of assessors will be kept, and the Secretariat 
will try to keep the process a mutual one, in which all members provide 
an expert for at least one mutual evaluation”.78 Fourth, the FATF process 
places great emphasis on on-site inspection as a means to gauge success of 
implementation: 
The on-site visit provides the best opportunity to clarify issues relating 
to the country’s AML/CFT system, and assessors need to be fully 
74 Ibid., p. 14.
75 Global Witness, How FATF Can Measure and Promote an Effective Anti-Money 
Laundering System, 2012, p. 3. 
76 FATF, Third Round of AML/CFT Mutual Evaluations: Process and Procedures, 
2009, p. 5. 
77 Ibid., p. 7. 
78 Ibid., p. 6. 
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prepared to not only examine the laws, regulations, guidelines and 
institutional measures, but to also review the effectiveness of the 
system.79 
Fifth, as was the case with the APRM, the FATF model is not exclusively 
based on the governmental perspective, rather it integrates the view of 
the private sector. As the process and procedures document notes, “the 
meetings with the private sector are an important part of the visit, and 
generally, the assessors should be given the opportunity to meet with the 
various representatives of associations and institutions in private, and 
without a government official present”.80 
Finally, it is of note that the FATF operates on the basis of a system of 
“graduated peer pressure on noncomplying members”.81 As noted in 
the previous section, peer pressure is important and is likely to be most 
effective “when the outcome of the peer review is made available to the 
public ... . When the press is actively engaged with the story, peer pressure 
is most effective. Public scrutiny often arises from media involvement”.82 
The FATF does this particularly well. As Jensen and Png have stated, the 
FATF’s “rigorous scrutiny through mutual evaluation, public disclosure 
and its associated peer pressure has contributed significantly to the 
development of AML/CFT regimes around the world”, adding that 
“The peer pressure associated with the ongoing mutual evaluation and 
assessments and related public scrutiny and disclosure also has the effect of 
encouraging countries not to lag behind their peers”.83 All of this makes the 
voluntary nature of the FATF’s mutual evaluations particularly remarkable. 
As Lennane has stated, FATF mutual evaluations: 
do not pull punches … . Such frankness would turn most disarmament 
diplomats’ hair white: many of them spend their entire careers trying 
to ensure their governments are never exposed to such criticism. And 
79 Ibid., p. 7. 
80 Ibid. 
81 K.L. Gardner, “Fighting terrorism the FATF way”, Global Governance, vol. 13, 
no. 3, 2007, p. 333.
82 F. Pagani, Peer Review: A Tool for Co-operation and Change—An Analysis of 
an OECD Working Method, OECD document SG/LEG(2002)1, 11 September 
2002, para. 6.
83 See N. Jensen and C.-A. Png, “Implementation of the FATF 40+9 
Recommendations: a perspective from developing countries”, Journal of 
Money Laundering Control, vol. 14, no. 2, 2011.
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yet the member governments of the FATF willingly subject themselves 
to this kind of scrutiny, without any legal obligation to do so … .84
It remains clear that the work of the FATF is a far cry from the world of 
biological disarmament and the necessary resources to achieve an FATF-
level model means it is unlikely to be something that could be transferred 
wholesale to the BTWC. Nonetheless there is much to learn from this 
model, which, as the French working paper indicated, has proved a 
successful formula in the “development and promotion of national 
and international policies to combat money-laundering and terrorist 
financing”.85
OECD DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE COMMITTEE PEER REVIEW 
The OECD has more than 50 years of experience with peer-review 
mechanisms and currently employs such tools in a number of different 
fields including development assistance, environmental performance, and 
regulatory reform. The OECD states: 
Among the OECD’s core strengths is its ability to offer its members a 
framework to compare experiences and examine “best practices” in a 
host of areas ... .
…
OECD peer reviews, where each country’s policy in a particular 
area is examined by fellow members on an equal basis, lie at the 
heart of this process. A country ... can learn valuable lessons from 
its peers on what has worked and what has not. This can save time, 
and costly experimenting, in crafting effective national policies. 
The recommendations resulting from such a review can also help 
governments win support at home for difficult measures. And perhaps 
most importantly, because everyone goes through the same exercise, 
no country feels it is being singled out.86
One of the most established types of OECD peer review is that of the 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC), which serves as a space for
84 R. Lennane, “Verification for the BTWC: if not the protocol, then what?”, 
Disarmament Forum, no. 1, UNIDIR, 2011, p. 48. 
85 France, A Peer Review Mechanism for the Biological Weapons Convention: 
Enhancing Confidence in National Implementation and International 
Cooperation, document BWC/CONF.VII/WP.28, 13 December 2011, para. 2.
86 See “Peer review”, <www.oecd.org/site/peerreview>. 
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donors to “exchange experience and to address issues of common interest 
or concern”.87 Country reviews work on a quinquennial basis and the 
OECD conducts roughly five reviews each year. The purpose of the DAC 
peer-review process is: 
To monitor DAC Members’ development co-operation policies and • 
programmes, and assess their effectiveness, inputs, outputs and results 
against the goals and policies agreed in the DAC as well as nationally 
established objectives.
To assist in improving individual and collective aid performance in • 
both qualitative and quantitative terms.
To provide comparative reporting and credible analysis for wider • 
publics in OECD countries and the international community.
To identify best practices, share experience, and foster co-ordination.• 88
The process takes approximately six months and draws in a range of 
different actors, principally states and representatives of government 
departments, but also civil society and academia. There are seven phases 
to the OECD DAC peer-review process, described below.
OECD DAC PEER REVIEW89
Preparation
The preparatory phase involves the selection of examiners, the 
organization of meetings, and the collection of the relevant 
documentation in appropriate languages. 
Field visits
Field visits serve to elicit an “understanding of the way in which 
[policy] implementation is carried out in the field”.90 Visits are normally 
undertaken by members of the Secretariat and at least one examiner and 
last roughly a week, in which time the team speaks to “a wide range 
87 See “DAC information note on the peer review process for 
peer review participants”, <www.oecd.org/site/peerreview/
dacinformationnoteonthepeerreviewprocessforpeerreviewparticipants.htm>. 
88 Ibid.
89 Ibid.
90 Ibid.
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of local actors, including partner government officials, beneficiaries, civil 
society representatives and other major donors to that country”.91 These 
visits are preceded by a questionnaire “sent out to the reviewed country 
approximately one month in advance of the visit”. The questionnaire is 
tailor-made by the Secretariat and “provides the reviewed member with 
the issues of priority for the field visit”. This is normally accompanied by a 
formal letter “briefly explaining the process and requesting meetings with 
various relevant actors in the field, such as staff in the field, beneficiaries, 
local staff, civil society representatives, etc.”.92
Visit to the capital of the member under review
The OECD describes the visit to the capital as:
the main fact-finding mission of the review team. The mission to the 
capital seeks to cover all relevant areas of the reviewed Member’s 
programme, and involves interviews/meetings with a wide range 
of functional units within the aid ministry/agency. Meetings with 
Parliamentarians are also usual, as are sessions with [non-governmental 
organization] umbrella groups. Academics and research initiatives 
sometimes provide invaluable information and critiques.93 
The visit normally takes four to five days. 
Drafting of the report
Upon the completion of key field missions:
The Secretariat consolidates information gathered during the missions 
as well as from other sources. In consultation with the examiners, it 
drafts the two parts of the Peer Review report including the annexes. A 
draft of the Secretariat Report (Part 2) is first shared with the examiners 
for comments and is subsequently sent to the reviewed member who 
has one to two weeks to undertake a factual check of the text.94
The peer-review meeting
The peer-review meeting is a key element of the peer-review process 
and brings the DAC Chairman, the Secretariat, the examiners, and the 
91 Ibid.
92 Ibid.
93 Ibid.
94 OECD, Information Note on the DAC Peer Review Process, document 
DCD(2009)6/REV1, 6 September 2010, para. 18. 
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reviewed state together to present the findings and recommendations 
from the process over the course of a day-long meeting.95 
Editorial session
The editorial session takes place shortly after the peer-review meeting 
and serves to make any necessary factual changes and corrections to 
the report, which is subsequently reviewed by the examiners and the 
assessed state. 
Publication
The report is subsequently published in the quarterly journal of the DAC. 
Follow-up
Some six to eight months after the peer-review meeting, the DAC 
Chair returns to the examined state’s capital to “discuss adoption of 
the recommendations made at the time of the peer review meeting”. 
Member states are obliged to outline developments and activities 
undertaken over the intervening period.96 
Recent DAC reviews include Greece, Spain, the United States, and a 
“Special Review of the Slovak Republic’s Development Co-operation”, all 
of which are publicly available.97 Historically, all DAC members have been 
reviewed and, like the FATF and the APRM, DAC reviews are forthright in 
their language. For example: 
As identified in 2004, Italy needs appropriate government mechanisms 
to foster better coherence among policies. … The lack of political 
commitment, policy statements, and any mandate to ensure policies 
are coherent with development objectives, make institutional co-
ordination and monitoring difficult.98
95 See “DAC information note on the peer review process for 
peer review participants”, <www.oecd.org/site/peerreview/
dacinformationnoteonthepeerreviewprocessforpeerreviewparticipants.htm>.
96 Ibid.
97 See <www.oecd.org/dac/peerreviewsofdacmembers/publicationsdocuments/
reports>. 
98 See “Italy (2009) DAC peer review—main findings and recommendations”, 
<www.oecd.org/dac/peerreviewsofdacmembers/italy2009dacpeerreview-
mainfindingsandrecommendations.htm>. 
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Two other issues are of note on the OECD DAC reviews. The first is 
that there is a systematic process of sharing information on best practice 
and learning from each other’s mistakes and the OECD has collected 
and collated key lessons from the peer-review process99 that have been 
articulated in the OECD report Effective Aid Management—Twelve 
Lessons from DAC Peer Reviews.100 Another feature of the OECD process 
is that, as with other peer-review processes, the OECD engages a range 
of stakeholders including parliamentarians as well as “civil society 
representatives and other major donors to that country”,101 with the latter 
engaged both in field visits and the capital visits and identified as a valuable 
source of information for reviewers. 
IAEA INTEGRATED REGULATORY REVIEW SERVICE PEER-REVIEW MECHANISM
The process of peer review has been employed by the IAEA in several 
areas.102 Recognizing the overlap between these review processes, the 
IAEA’s Department of Nuclear Safety and Security sought to combine the 
99 See “Lessons from peer reviews”, <www.oecd.org/dac/
peerreviewsofdacmembers/lessonsfrompeerreviews.htm>. 
100 OECD, Effective Aid Management—Twelve Lessons from DAC Peer Reviews, 
2008.
101 See “DAC information note on the peer review process for 
peer review participants”, <www.oecd.org/site/peerreview/
dacinformationnoteonthepeerreviewprocessforpeerreviewparticipants.htm>.
102 For example: “(a) the International Regulatory Review Team (IRRT) programme 
that provided advice and assistance to Member States to strengthen and enhance 
the effectiveness of their legal and governmental infrastructure for nuclear 
safety; (b) the Radiation Safety and Security Infrastructure Appraisal (RaSSIA) 
that assessed the effectiveness of the national regulatory infrastructure for 
radiation safety including the safety and security of radioactive sources; (c) the 
Transport Safety Appraisal Service (TranSAS) that appraises the implementation 
of the IAEA’s Transport Regulations; (d) the Emergency Preparedness Review 
(EPREV) that reviews both preparedness in the case of nuclear accidents 
and radiological emergencies and the appropriate legislation; and (e) the 
International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) that reviews the 
effectiveness of State systems of physical protection and [provides] advice 
and assistance to strengthen and enhance these systems”; see “Workshop on 
the Lessons Learned from the Integrated Regulatory Review Services (IRRS) 
Mission to Spain”, <www-pub.iaea.org/mtcd/meetings/Announcements.
asp?ConfID=37373>.
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reviews and “developed an integrated approach”.103 This resulted in the 
creation of the IAEA’s Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) in 2006. 
The IRRS is designed to: 
strengthen and enhance the effectiveness of the national regulatory 
infrastructure of States for nuclear, radiation, radioactive waste and 
transport safety and security of radioactive sources whilst recognizing 
the ultimate responsibility of each State to ensure safety in the above 
areas.104
IRRS missions are explicitly “not inspections or audits”105 but peer-review 
evaluations conducted by expert peer teams, consisting of between 15 
and 25106 experts who are selected by the IAEA from other IAEA member 
states.107 These teams are tasked with conducting an objective evaluation of 
the host state’s national regulatory system vis-à-vis established international 
standards,108 as articulated in documents such as the IAEA Safety Standards 
Series publication Governmental, Legal and Regulatory Framework for 
Safety,109 and developing a series of recommendations where necessary. 
While assessment is standardized, the IRRS recognizes that an approach to 
nuclear regulation must include room for variance: 
The IRRS process recognizes that organizational structure and 
regulatory processes vary from country to country depending on 
national legal and administrative systems, the size and structure of 
the nuclear and radiation protection programme, financial resources 
available to the regulatory body, social customs and cultural traditions. 
103 Ibid. 
104 See “Integrated Regulatory Review Service”, <www-ns.iaea.org/reviews/rs-
reviews.asp>. 
105 IAEA, International Nuclear Safety Experts Conclude IAEA Peer Review of Swiss 
Regulatory Framework, press release 2011/28, 2 December 2011. 
106 See “Integrated Regulatory Review Service mission to the United States”, 
<www.nrc.gov/public-involve/conference-symposia/irrs-mission-review.
html>. 
107 See Swedish Radiation Safety Authority, IRRS 2012: Integrated Regulatory 
Review Service at the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority, 2012.
108 See “Integrated Regulatory Review Service”, <www-ns.iaea.org/reviews/rs-
reviews.asp>; see also “IAEA Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) 
missions to the United Kingdom”, <www.hse.gov.uk/nuclear/regulatoryreview/
index.htm>. 
109 See IAEA, Governmental, Legal and Regulatory Framework for Safety, document 
STI/PUB/1465, 2010. 
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The IRRS has been constructed to allow for all such variations within a 
single integrated review service.
…
It … accepts different approaches to the organization and practices of 
a regulatory framework and regulatory body that contribute to a strong 
national nuclear and radiation safety regime.110
This is achieved through the adoption of a modular approach to reviewing, 
with different modules focusing on specific areas; for example the IRRS 
safety package includes modules on, inter alia, “Governmental, Legal and 
Regulatory Framework for Safety”, “Human Resources Development” and 
“Radiation Protection”.111 The process enables the service to be tailored to 
“meet the needs and priorities of the Member State”.112
These areas are dealt with over three phases beginning with a self-
assessment exercise in which the state under review completes a 
questionnaire process. The responses are then evaluated by the assessor 
team. Subsequently, in the second phase, the assessment team conducts 
an independent peer review (including on-site inspections) and completes 
a report with recommendations and suggestions for improvement. In the 
third phase a final action plan is developed based on the recommendations 
and suggestions in the peer-review report and the preliminary action plan. 
In the years following the peer-review process the evaluated state will seek 
to respond to the recommendations and suggestions agreed upon.
IAEA IRRS REVIEWS (BASED ON THE SWEDISH AND US REVIEW PROCESSES)
Self-assessment
In the first phase a state will conduct a self-assessment process using 
IRRS guidelines and the Self-Assessment Tool that has been developed 
“for Member States to facilitate the self-assessment of national regulatory 
110 See “Integrated Regulatory Review Service”, <www-ns.iaea.org/reviews/rs-
reviews.asp>.
111 See “Establishing the safety infrastructure“, <www-ns.iaea.org/tech-areas/
safety-infrastructure/ssg-16-module-1.asp?s=0&l=94>. 
112 IAEA, Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) to Germany, 28 November 
2008, p. ii.
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infrastructure for nuclear and radiation safety”.113 The assessor team 
conducts a review of the written material at this stage. In the Swedish 
case, the first phase resulted in “a summary report and a preliminary 
action plan on improvement measures in the short and long term”.114
IRRS peer-review mission
In the second phase, the assessor team “independently peer reviews 
the host regulator to evaluate the self-assessment and the regulator’s 
planned actions”.115 This second phase employs a number of methods 
including interviews with counterparts and other personnel and “Direct 
observations of organization, practices and activities (regulatory body, 
government departments and nuclear facilities and activities)”.116 
The team then produces a report containing “recommendations and 
suggestions for improvement”, which is submitted to the responsible 
regulatory authority.117 
Final action plan
In the third phase of the IRRS process the regulatory authority uses “the 
preliminary action plan and the review team’s recommendations and 
suggestions as a platform for a final action plan based on results from the 
review report. Implementation of the action plan will be followed up in 
an additional IRRS review mission after two to four years”.118
A number of points are of note for the purpose of this study. First, 
recognizing that no one size fits all, the IRRS has developed a modular 
approach to evaluation that enables states under review to select areas of 
113 See “Integrated Regulatory Review Service”, <www-ns.iaea.org/reviews/rs-
reviews.asp>. 
114 Swedish Radiation Safety Authority, IRRS 2012: Integrated Regulatory Review 
Service at the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority, 2012, p. 6. 
115 See “Integrated Regulatory Review Service mission to the United States”, 
<www.nrc.gov/public-involve/conference-symposia/irrs-mission-review.
html>.
116 G. Caruso and K. Mrabit, IRRS Highlights, 2007, p. 25, <www-ns.iaea.org/
downloads/coordination/snr-reg-meeting-2007/SRM2007-CarusoMrabit.
pdf>. 
117 Swedish Radiation Safety Authority, IRRS 2012: Integrated Regulatory Review 
Service at the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority, 2012, p. 6.
118 Ibid.
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assessment. The process also takes into consideration differences between 
states’ legal systems, financial resources, social customs, and culture.119 
This approach is interesting as it suggests it is possible to develop a flexible 
and scalable approach to peer review in an organization such as the IAEA. 
Related to this point, it is also apparent that new modules of assessment 
can be added over time as new issues emerge, for example to adapt 
assessment modules to suit a changing context and membership. In 2012, 
for example, a “‘Fukushima module’ was incorporated into the scope of 
IRRS missions to take account of the initial regulatory implications of the 
accident”.120
A second feature is that the peer-review system includes interviews and 
discussion with staff and “Direct observations of organization, practices 
and activities (regulatory body, government departments and nuclear 
facilities and activities)”.121 In the case of the United States, for example, 
as part of the 2011 review IRRS held interviews with management and 
staff at Limerick nuclear power plant and Salem nuclear power plant.122 
In the case of the United Kingdom’s second review there was a “routine 
inspection” of the Sellafield nuclear plant. In China, “the IRRS team visited 
several nuclear facilities, including a nuclear power plant, a manufacturer 
of safety components for nuclear power plants, a research reactor, a fuel 
cycle facility”.123 In the Islamic Republic of Iran, IRRS reviewers were 
invited to the Bushehr nuclear power plant. Effectively this suggests peer-
review teams are able to conduct “on-site” evaluations of the regulatory 
practices employed in nuclear facilities and speak with staff in facilities. 
A third interlinked feature is that the IAEA IRRS reviews appear to be in 
demand across the globe, something that is remarkable considering that 
states pay to voluntarily expose—albeit selected—nuclear power facilities
119 There is, for example, a specific approach for developing countries; see “IRRS 
Tailored for the Embarking Countries [Embarking Nuclear Power States]”, 
<www-ns.iaea.org/downloads/ni/ds424-files/Catalog_ReviewService_
SafetyInf_Mod1.pdf>. 
120 IAEA, IAEA Annual Report 2011, document GC(56)/2, 2011, p. 18.
121 G. Caruso and K. Mrabit, IRRS Highlights, 2007, p. 25, <www-ns.iaea.org/
downloads/coordination/snr-reg-meeting-2007/SRM2007-CarusoMrabit.
pdf>. 
122 See IAEA, The Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) Mission to the United 
States of America, document IAEA-NS-IRRS-2010/02, 2010. 
123 IAEA, International Nuclear Safety Experts Conclude IAEA Peer Review of 
China’s Regulatory System, press release 2010/10, 20 July 2010.
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to an international inspection team and then subject aspects of these 
facilities to criticism that, as with other peer-review models, is blunt. The 
IRRS review requested by the Greek Atomic Energy Commission, for 
example, identified several issues warranting attention and stated that 
“the nation’s legal framework is dated, lacks the flexibility of a risk-based 
regulatory framework that provides for a graded approach to safety and has 
gaps particularly in respect of waste and decommissioning”.124 The IRRS 
review of the Iranian Bushehr nuclear power plant, which was conducted 
at the invitation of the Islamic Republic of Iran, for example, stated that: 
The Government should support the prompt enactment of a • 
law establishing INRA [Iran Nuclear Regulatory Authority] as an 
independent nuclear regulatory authority, as well as provide it with all 
authority and resources needed to carry out its functions.
The Government is encouraged to join the • Convention on Nuclear 
Safety and the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management 
and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management.
INRA should replace the existing set of ad hoc regulatory requirements • 
with a comprehensive system of national nuclear safety regulations.125
Despite such forthright recommendations, based on the IAEA annual 
reports and press releases more that 40 states have had some degree of 
peer-review process undertaken, including Botswana, Canada, China, 
Côte d’Ivoire, Germany, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Lebanon, Peru, the 
Republic of Korea, Romania, the Russian Federation, Slovenia, Sweden, 
Switzerland, the United Arab Emirates, the United States, and Viet Nam. 
This suggests there is something inherently beneficial from the process, not 
least of which is that states can—and follow-up reports would suggest do—
take advantage of the recommendations and suggestions offered by the 
IRRS experts in the development of the state’s regulatory regime. To quote 
the Greek Atomic Energy Commission on its reasoning why IRRS visits are 
important, it was stated that they enable “the identification of strengths 
and weaknesses, the improvement of … efficiency and effectiveness, the 
sharing of international experience and good practices”.126
124 IAEA, IAEA Team Concludes Peer Review of Greece’s Regulatory Framework for 
Radiation Safety, press release 2012/12, 31 May 2012. 
125 See IAEA, International Experts Conclude IAEA Peer Review of Iran’s Safety 
Regulation of Bushehr NPP, press release 2010/03, 2 March 2010.
126 See “IRRS mission in Greece”, <www.eeae.gr/en/index.php?fvar=html/
president/_ana_irrs_mission>.
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EUROPEAN NUCLEAR SAFETY REGULATORS GROUP STRESS TESTS
Following the events at the Fukushima Daiichi power plant in 2011, the 
European Council requested European nuclear plants be subjected to a 
“comprehensive safety and risk assessment”, the purpose of which was: 
to assess the compliance of the stress tests with the ENSREG [European 
Nuclear Safety Regulators Group] specifications, to check that no 
important problem has been overlooked and to identify strong features, 
weaknesses and relevant proposals to increase plant robustness in light 
of the preliminary lessons learned from the Fukushima disaster.127
The ENSREG peer-review assessment process was novel in the sense that it 
employed data from a focused “stress test” process voluntarily undertaken 
by European Union member states in order to “assess the safety and 
robustness of nuclear power plants … with regard to the preliminary 
lessons learned from Fukushima”.128 Building on the stress tests, the 
peer-review process sought to evaluate the “comprehensiveness and the 
consistency with standards of the approaches taken by the operators and 
the national regulators in their work”,129 and was conducted though a two-
phase methodology beginning with a desk-based review of the national 
reports focusing particularly on topics of extreme natural hazards, loss of 
safety systems, and severe accident management issues.130 The results of 
the topical review were subsequently integrated into national reports that 
were enhanced through a process of discussion and visits to nuclear power 
facilities designed to resolve any outstanding issues. 
The ENSREG peer-review process has received criticism from a range 
of different bodies. For example, Greenpeace suggested that “national 
regulators hijacked the peer-review system and undermined its credibility” 
and that regulators were unable to “think the unthinkable”, dismissing 
some proposed scenarios as hypothetical, which weakened the exercise.131 
127 ENSREG, Peer Review Report: Stress Tests Performed on European Nuclear 
Power Plants, document v12i–2012 04 25, 2012, p. 2. 
128 Ibid., p. 7.
129 Ibid., p. 8.
130 See “Public meeting: post-Fukushima stress tests peer review”, <www.
ensreg.eu/sites/default/files/Stress%20Tests%20-%20Peer%20review%20-%20
Public%20meeting%20notes%20-.pdf>. 
131 J. Haverkamp, Can the Stress Tests Be Saved from Greenwash?, Greenpeace, 
2012, p. 2, <www.ensreg.eu/sites/default/files/13-Greenpeace-Haverkamp-
paper.pdf>. 
34
The European Atomic Forum, an association of nuclear industry actors in 
Europe, criticized the ENSREG process for failing to fully appreciate the 
depth of differences in facilities in Europe and overlooking the importance 
of the “organizational and human factor”. They did however recognize 
that “Peer Review allows for sharing best practices and contributes to 
global improvement”.132 Moreover ENSREG acknowledged that they faced 
a number of challenges themselves including: 
coordination of many participants; • 
variation in the quality of the reviews;• 
difficulties with ensuring a common assessment of national reports • 
based on different national regulatory approaches; and
differing expectations of the peer-review process.• 133 
The criticism of ENSREG peer reviews is perhaps mitigated by the fact 
that the stress test and peer-review exercise were both novel and are 
acknowledged as having been “conducted over a deliberately compressed 
timescale”.134 
There are a number of novel features in the ENSREG stress test and peer-
review process. The first is that it was designed specifically in response to 
an event and provided ENSREG an intensive process for learning lessons 
after Fukushima. This may kick-start a broader range of activities as it could 
provide input for further improvements and/or harmonization. The process 
also enhanced public understanding of the nuclear industry and perhaps 
improved confidence among the public in the wake of the Fukushima 
disaster. A second feature is that, as in the IAEA IRRS peer-review process, 
the ENSREG review teams were permitted to visit nuclear plants with the 
review team identifying which plant to visit in each country.135 During 
the plant visit “staff and facilities were also made available to the visiting 
132 J.-P. Poncelet and J.-P. Berger, Perspective on the “Stress Tests” (Complementary 
Safety Assessments) and Peer Reviews: The European Nuclear Industry View, 
presentation at the Public Meeting on Post-Fukushima Stress Tests and Peer 
Review, Brussels, 17 January 2012, p. 16, <www.ensreg.eu/sites/default/
files/10-Foratom-Pocelet.pdf>.
133 P. Jamet, Stress Tests Peer Review, presentation at the Public Meeting on Post-
Fukushima Stress Tests and Peer Review, Brussels, 17 January 2012, pp. 20–
23.
134 ENSREG, Peer Review Report: Stress Tests Performed on European Nuclear 
Power Plants, document v12i–2012 04 25, 2012, p. 14. 
135 Ibid, p. 3.
35
team to discuss ... issues” and this served to “provide complementary 
information on some aspects of the implementation and results of the stress 
tests”.136 A third feature is that a number of questions and comments from 
the general public were invited and an “opportunity to submit suggestions 
via the internet to be considered in the peer-review process was provided 
from 1 to 20 January 2012 at the Commission’s Joint Research Centre 
website”.137 Moreover there was a public meeting on “Post-Fukushima 
Stress Tests and Peer Review”, held in Brussels in January 2012 with 
participation of the European nuclear industry, the European Federation of 
Trade Unions, and Greenpeace.138
THE FUNCTIONS OF PEER REVIEW
The concept of peer review in international organizations is not new, yet it 
does appear to be gaining popularity and is increasingly widely used in the 
areas identified above. Peer review has been used by, among others, the 
United Nations Environment Programme, the United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development, the United Nations Economic Commission 
for Europe, and the International Monetary Fund. Despite being devoid of 
the teeth that characterize traditional inspection regimes in arms control 
agreements, peer review does appear to offer a carrot and a stick, as well 
as a space for explanation and the sharing of best practice. Indeed, peer 
review can assume a number of functions.
PEER REVIEW AS A TRANSPARENCY AND CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MECHANISM 
The peer-review process requires the collection, collation, and translation 
of detailed information on activities undertaken by the state under review. 
The availability of such information is useful as a transparency mechanism, 
particularly as a space is provided to consult on and clarify any ambiguities 
or doubts, check the accuracy of national submissions, and raise any 
questions the submitted material may generate in a safe environment. 
In this regard transparency provided for a peer-review process should be 
understood as “more than just the availability of relevant information. It 
136 Ibid, p. 11.
137 See “Public engagement”, <www.ensreg.eu/EU-Stress-Tests/Public-
engagement>. 
138 See “Public meeting 17 January, 2012”, <www.ensreg.eu/EU-Stress-Tests/
Public-engagement/Public-Meeting>. 
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is also about usefulness. It is about taking note, reflecting, analyzing and 
assessing the information exchanged, and ensuring that any outstanding 
and emerging questions are answered”.139 Peer review therefore has the 
potential to serve to build transparency and resolve any ambiguities or 
questions surrounding a state’s practice. This in turn could help in building 
confidence; knowing what other states have in place to comply with 
obligations (and knowing that what is in place has been independently 
evaluated and subjected to quality control) would certainly provide a 
clearer picture of the state of play. 
PEER REVIEW AS A MECHANISM FOR QUALITY CONTROL 
One of the key roles of peer review is as a means of engendering quality 
control and identifying weaknesses in a system in practice in order to 
rectify issues and raise standards. For example, the IRRS peer review of the 
Swedish nuclear environment provided “valuable insight for our continued 
improvement work. A review of our operations strengthens our credibility 
and helps us to live up to our motto, ‘Radiation safety first!’”.140 To quote 
Swiss Federal Nuclear Safety Inspectorate Director General Hans Wanner, 
“The findings of the IRRS mission will help us to further improve our work. 
That is part of our safety culture”.141
PEER REVIEW AS A FORUM FOR SHARING BEST PRACTICE AND CAPACITY-BUILDING
A number of peer-review systems are designed wholly or in part as a 
means to share best practice. As an OECD report on the topic states, “Peer 
review can also serve as an important capacity-building instrument, since 
it is a mutual learning process in which best practices are exchanged. This 
is true not only for the country under review, but also for other countries, 
especially those acting as lead examiners”.142 Certainly this is the case 
139 Norway, Switzerland, and New Zealand, Working Paper on the Confidence 
Building Measures, 2011, <www.opbw.org/rev_cons/7rc/BWC_CONF.VII_
WP_Norway-NewZealand-Switz_E.pdf>. 
140 Swedish Radiation Safety Authority, IRRS 2012: Integrated Regulatory Review 
Service at the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority, 2012, p. 3.
141 See “International Nuclear Safety Experts conclude IAEA peer review of Swiss 
regulatory framework”, <http://static.ensi.ch/1322814627/irrs-press-release.
pdf>. 
142 OECD, Peer Review: A Tool for Co-operation and Change, policy brief, January 
2007, p. 6.
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with the IAEA IRRS mechanism, which has the objective of “sharing of 
international experience and good practices”.143 The APRM mechanism is 
explicit in its objective of the “sharing of experiences and reinforcement 
of successful and best practices”.144 The process of sharing best practice 
in turn serves to improve individual and collective performance and build 
capacity in specific issue areas addressed by the peer-review process. This 
is perhaps particularly useful in circumstances where concepts, such as 
the practice of laboratory biosecurity, are relatively new in many places 
around the world.
PEER REVIEW AS A MEANS TO APPLY PRESSURE 
Finally, peer review operates on the basis of interlinked peer pressure 
and public scrutiny, particularly if the results and recommendations of 
a peer-review process are made publicly available as this can serve to 
“name and shame”. As one commentary on the FATF mutual evaluations 
states, “the peer pressure associated with the ongoing mutual evaluation 
and assessments and related public scrutiny and disclosure also has the 
effect of encouraging countries not to lag behind their peers”.145 Yet unlike 
traditional legal enforcement mechanisms the peer-review process has the 
flexibility to take into account a state’s policy objectives, and to look at its 
performance in a historical and political context. 
A PEER-REVIEW MECHANISM FOR THE BTWC
The concept of a peer-review mechanism should not be alien to the 
BTWC states parties. On the contrary, historically the use of peer-review 
mechanisms has been raised by a number of different states and other 
stakeholders within the BTWC forum, albeit in very different contexts. For 
example, a small collective of states parties to the Convention have already 
engaged in meetings, such as the “Ensuring Compliance with the Biological 
Weapons Convention” meeting, the purpose of which was:
143 IAEA, IAEA Team Concludes Peer Review of Greece’s Regulatory Framework for 
Radiation Safety, press release 2012/12, 31 May 2012.
144 See “About APRM”, <http://aprm-au.org/about-aprm>. 
145 See N. Jensen and C.-A. Png, “Implementation of the FATF 40+9 
Recommendations: a perspective from developing countries”, Journal of 
Money Laundering Control, vol. 14, no. 2, 2011.
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to facilitate information sharing and discussion among a small group 
of governmental and non-governmental experts about the processes 
used by various governments and government agencies to ensure their 
compliance with the [BTWC]. Its goal was to increase participants’ 
understanding of these processes and their underlying rationales, 
similarities, and differences, as well as to discuss issues surrounding the 
sharing of compliance-related information.146
Within the BTWC forum a number of states have used the term. For 
example, a 2005 Indian working paper on the role of codes of conduct 
alluded to the “creation of institutional framework and processes to ensure 
voluntary compliance with the codes of conduct, peer review of research 
work, minimization of risks and provision of opportunity for scientists to 
abstain or dissociate from engaging in a particular research work”.147
Similarly, in a working paper prepared by Canada for the 2005 Meeting of 
Experts, it was suggested that “several codes, particularly in the academic 
field, stress the importance of obtaining approval and peer review of 
research. Without this check, it is possible that a project could veer into 
unintended or dangerous territory”.148 Japan identified peer review as 
“widely accepted by scientists as means to evaluate scientific research 
results before publication ... To incorporate the viewpoint of ‘preventing 
abuse/misuse of science and technology’ into peer review process may be 
acceptable, effective and practical means for scientists”.149
Several other presentations submitted to intersessional meetings 
have alluded to ensuring “peer review for safety, security and ethical 
146 Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation; Center for International and 
Security Studies at Maryland; Center for Science, Technology and Security 
Policy, American Association for the Advancement of Science; Center for the 
Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction, National Defense University, Ensuring 
Compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention: Meeting Report, 2008, 
p. 1.
147 India, India’s Approach to Codes of Conduct for Scientists, document BWC/
MSP/2005/WP.1, 1 December 2005, para. 6. 
148 Canada, The Overlap between Codes of Conduct and Legislation, document 
BWC/MSP/2005/MX/WP.7, 9 June 2005, para. 4. 
149 K. Serizawa, “Codes of conduct for scientists discussion in Japan”, 
presentation to the Meeting of Experts, 21 June 2005, p. 15, <www.
opbw.org/new_process/mx2005/other_pres/21jun05/21jun_MX05_japan_
serizawaMinistryForeignAff_pres.pdf>. 
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implications”,150 and this past discussion, combined with the diverse nature 
of peer-review mechanisms employed around the globe in other areas, 
suggests that the concept of peer review could be applied to the BTWC in 
a number of different ways, from a process in which an assessment team 
conducts an evaluation of university biosafety provisions to an assessment 
of biodefence oversight mechanisms.151 Because of this diversity in peer-
review models and the broad scope for application within the context of 
the BTWC, the following section explores how a modular approach to a 
BTWC peer-review mechanism could be applied in order to provide food 
for thought to states parties that are seeking to nurture the Convention. 
In the modular peer-review approach, the starting point would be a basic 
package, most logically focused on national legislation and regulation. 
The importance of national legislation has been recognized in an EU Joint 
Action in support of the BTWC152 and United Nations Security Council 
resolution 1540, among other mechanisms, and has been discussed 
at length in several intersessional process meetings in 2003 and 2007. 
Accordingly it is perhaps a solid starting place for any peer-review exercise 
in the Convention, and a basic package would focus on reviewing the 
implementation of legislation and regulations by a state party.
Although national legislation is clearly important, there are limitations 
to the value of focusing solely on a review of legislation, not least 
because there is more to having an effective regulatory system than just 
laws. As Wetter has remarked, “National legislation is a good—indeed 
essential—start, but to ensure compliance, national controls must be both 
enforceable and properly enforced. Their enforcement requires the active 
and competent involvement of national customs, police, intelligence and 
prosecution services”.153
150 United States of America, Presentations Submitted by the United States, 
document BWC/MSP/2005/MX/MISC.4, 28 June 2005, p. 17.
151 Canada and Switzerland, National Implementation of the BTWC: 
Compliance Assessment, document BWC/MSP/2012/MX/WP.17, 3 August 
2012.
152 See “BTWC implementation assistance”, <www.euja-btwc.eu/
implementation>. 
153 A. Wetter, Enforcing European Union Law on Exports of Dual-use Goods, SIPRI 
Research Report no. 24, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 
p. 138. 
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Moreover, it is increasingly apparent that implementing the BTWC 
requires considerably more than the adoption of legislation, and “if the 
Intersessional Process has done nothing else, it has shown that there is 
a great deal more to national implementation than the concise terms of 
Article IV of the [BTWC] would suggest”.154 Accordingly, a more ambitious 
approach to a BTWC peer-review mechanism could seek to look at 
implementation of the Convention more broadly and add on a number 
of modular components as required. Based on past areas of agreement 
in either intersessional meetings of states parties or Review Conferences, 
the following could be considered for inclusion as optional modules to 
be added to the basic package: export control provision; biosecurity and 
biosafety provision; outreach, codes, education and engagement; disease 
outbreak detection and response capacity, international cooperation and 
assistance; and oversight. These are detailed below.
ADDITIONAL OPTIONAL MODULES
International cooperation and assistance
Successive review conferences have stressed the importance of 
implementing article X of the BTWC, and in this regard, just as the DAC 
peer-review process has enabled OECD states to share best practice on 
the delivery of development assistance, the inclusion of an international 
cooperation module that looked at the extent and efficacy of a state 
party’s international cooperation in the life sciences and/or readiness 
to provide assistance could be developed as a separate additional 
module. At the very least the process could initiate a technical discussion 
based on independently verified data that could feed into ongoing 
discussions under the Cooperation and Assistance Standing Agenda Item, 
and could look at states parties’ implementation of article X; “challenges 
and obstacles to developing international cooperation, assistance and 
exchange in the biological sciences and technology”; or “ways and 
means to target and mobilize resources, including financial resources, to 
address gaps and needs for assistance and cooperation”.155
154 R. Lennane, “Building on success: the future of the intersessional process”, in 
P. Millet (ed.), Improving Implementation of the Biological Weapons Convention: 
The 2007–2010 Intersessional Process, UNIDIR, 2011, p. 259. 
155 See Seventh Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the 
Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological 
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, Final Document 
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Export control 
Successive Review Conferences have called “for appropriate measures, 
including effective national export controls, by all States Parties”156 
and over the course of the last decade there has emerged a degree of 
“consistency in the identification of the principal elements of effective 
implementation of actual measures under the [BTWC]”.157 An export 
control module could be used to review a state party’s national 
regulations governing export controls in order to ensure it was both 
fit for purpose and consistent with the objectives of the Convention. 
Such a review could draw on language employed in Security Council 
resolution 1540, past intersessional discussions on export controls, and 
widely accepted standards to inform a review of what measures states 
parties had undertaken in areas such as the development of a credible 
legal basis for prosecution of export violations,158 ensuring “catch-all 
controls”,159 engaging industry,160 and wrestling with the challenges 
posed by intangible exports. There could be significant benefits from the 
inclusion of visits to observe how customs and export control measures 
operate in practice.
Laboratory biosecurity and biosafety 
In 2008 states parties developed common understandings for the terms 
biosafety and biosecurity in the context of the Convention and agreed 
of the Seventh Review Conference, document BWC/CONF.VII/7, 13 January 
2012, para. 16.
156 See ibid. and Seventh Review Conference of the States Parties to the 
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and 
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their 
Destruction, Additional Understandings and Agreements Reached by Previous 
Review Conferences Relating to Each Article of the Convention, document 
BWC/CONF.VII/INF.5, 28 September 2011. 
157 J. Littlewood, “Export controls and the non-proliferation of materials: national 
boundaries in international science”, in B. Rappert and C. McLeish (eds.), A 
Web of Prevention: Biological Weapons, Life Sciences and the Governance of 
Research, 2007, p. 148. 
158 See Australia, Practical Aspects of Export Licensing: Australia’s Experience, 
document BWC/MSP.2003/MX/WP.56, 28 August 2003, p. 2.
159 Security Council, Report Submitted Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 
1540 (2004), UN document S/AC.44/2004 /(02)/4, 14 October 2004, p. 8.
160 See “Key elements of an effective export control system”, <www.exportcontrols.
org/key_elements.htm#introduction>.
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by consensus that “biosafety and biosecurity measures contribute 
to preventing the development, acquisition or use of biological and 
toxin weapons and are an appropriate means of implementing the 
Convention”.161 The 2008 meeting moreover identified a number of tools 
such as accreditation tools that could be used to build biosecurity. Based 
on aspects of the discussion from 2008 and wider biorisk management 
standards that have been developed at the regional or the international 
level, a biosecurity and biosafety module could be designed to review 
the extent to which states parties had taken into consideration key 
issues related to biosafety and biosecurity, such as personnel reliability, 
physical security, information technology security, material control and 
accountability, material transfer security, and programme management. 
As with export controls, a review of biosafety and biosecurity could 
benefit from on-site visits that look at implementation in practice as part 
of a performance review. 
Outreach, codes, education, and engagement
Outreach, codes, education, awareness-raising, and engagement have 
become increasingly salient over the course of the last two intersessional 
processes and there is a wealth of materials from past meetings, but 
particularly 2005 and 2009, that could be employed to inform a peer-
review module looking at these topics. Such a module could review the 
extent to which states have implemented these sorts of mechanisms and 
could benefit from the addition of a survey process for academic and 
other relevant institutes in order to determine what had been done, if 
anything at all. In cases where there was information this could be 
particularly useful to exchange lessons learned and best practice among 
other interested state parties and other actors. In cases where there was 
no evidence of activity it could perhaps raise the question of why nothing 
had been done.
Disease outbreak detection and response capacity 
In 2011, the Seventh Review Conference called upon states parties “to 
continue establishing and/or improving national and regional capabilities 
161 Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and 
Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, Report of the Meeting of States 
Parties, document BWC/MSP/2008/5, 12 December 2008, para. 21.
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to survey, detect, diagnose and combat infectious diseases”,162 and this 
follows intersessional meetings in 2004 and 2009 that focused on issues 
related to disease outbreak detection and response. In this regard, states 
parties could consider developing an additional peer-review module to 
look at disease outbreak detection and response capacity. 
Oversight mechanisms
In 2008, “States Parties recognised the value of developing national 
frameworks to prohibit and prevent the possibility of biological agents 
or toxins being used as weapons, including measures to oversee relevant 
people, materials, knowledge and information, in the private and 
public sectors and throughout the scientific life cycle”.163 An oversight 
mechanisms module could be developed as an additional module 
through which to review what measures a state party has in place to guide 
researchers on BTWC compliance and ensure consistency of research—
particularly biodefence research—with prevalent interpretations of what 
was prohibited and what was permitted. Such a module is likely to be the 
most politically sensitive as it straddles compliance with obligations and 
prohibitions of the Convention. However there is already some evidence 
of states conducting a peer review of sorts of each others’ biodefence 
oversight, all be it in an ad hoc manner. For example, in 2008, as noted 
above, a collective of academic and non-governmental institutions along 
with government participants from Australia, Canada, Germany, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States:
organized a meeting on the processes used by several States Parties 
to the [BTWC] to assess and ensure their own compliance with the 
Convention. 
The purpose of the meeting … was to facilitate information sharing 
and discussion among a small group of governmental and non-
governmental experts about the processes used by various governments 
162 Seventh Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the 
Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological 
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, Final Document 
of the Seventh Review Conference, document BWC/CONF.VII/7, 13 January 
2012, para. 54(d).
163 Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and 
Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, Report of the Meeting of States 
Parties, document BWC/MSP/2008/5, 12 December 2008, para. 25.
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and government agencies to ensure their compliance with the [BTWC]. 
Its goal was to increase participants’ understanding of these processes 
and their underlying rationales, similarities, and differences, as well 
as to discuss issues surrounding the sharing of compliance-related 
information.164 
The approach to peer review presented here would thus seek to build on 
the model successfully employed by the IAEA IRRS peer-review process 
and would be a voluntary review in which states could, if required, select 
“modules” of assessment that would be “initiated at the request of the State 
concerned”.165 Given the potential breadth of modules of review, there 
would be a commensurate requirement for a larger team of experts and 
an expanded data collection process. In turn, should there be appetite for 
“adding on” a number of modules, the peer-review process would likely 
benefit from some form of administrative assistance and management 
particularly in the preparatory phase where a number of arrangements 
would need to be made.
THE PREPARATORY PHASE
Following the selection of modules by a state party, the first stage of a 
peer-review mechanism would be the preparatory process of scheduling 
different meetings, arranging for the collection, collation, and translation 
of the relevant information in the target language, and the selection of a 
suitable peer-review team. In terms of the peer-review team, the process 
of selection remains dependent upon whether additional modules are 
required. At a minimum, the basic package for peer review would require 
legal expertise. However the addition of other modules will variously entail 
experience with export controls and customs, biosecurity and biosafety, 
law enforcement, public health, and development. Complicating the 
164 Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation; Center for International and 
Security Studies at Maryland; Center for Science, Technology and Security 
Policy, American Association for the Advancement of Science; Center for the 
Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction, National Defense University, Ensuring 
Compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention: Meeting Report, 2008, 
p. 1.
165 France, A Peer Review Mechanism for the Biological Weapons Convention: 
Enhancing Confidence in National Implementation and International 
Cooperation, document BWC/CONF.VII/WP.28, 13 December 2011, para. 6. 
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peer-review team selection process is that there will need to be a balance 
between geographical representation in team members and regional 
appreciation of the context of the state under review. This could be helpful 
in avoiding narrow approaches to conducting a peer review that rely on 
any prescribed one-size-fits-all approach.
Regarding the gathering of suitable information, a comprehensive 
approach would require a comprehensive baseline of data in a number 
of different areas. Given the limitations of confidence-building measures 
and quinquennial compliance reports, it is unlikely that existing national 
submissions will be adequate to conduct a broad review (see the discussion 
on baseline of state information in the following section). Thus there will 
be a need to elicit detailed information from the state under review and 
this will take time to collect, collate, and translate, and for reasons of 
consistency this process could benefit from some form of guidance for the 
assembly of relevant materials wherein states parties could explain how 
they have attended to each of the areas under review.
Optional addition 1—National survey
On possible additional components that could be considered as a means 
to augment the data collection process, particularly for those that wanted 
to add on modules related to biosecurity and biosafety, or outreach, 
codes, education and engagement, one option could be through activity 
reports from those engaged in the life sciences at the local level, such 
as biosafety officers working in academia and industry, to provide 
information on what the situation is locally. Such an approach would be 
consistent with the trends towards greater stakeholder engagement in 
the BTWC’s decentralized, network model166 and could go some way to 
raise awareness of the Convention among those scientists working in the 
lab that are currently far removed from developments in disarmament 
diplomacy. Such a stakeholder survey need not be arduous and could be 
as simple as an email or letter enquiring: 
What measures are in place to build safety and security within your • 
institution?
Are staff bound by any form of code of conduct or written guidelines?• 
166 P. Millett, “Why the 2011 BTWC RevCon might not be business as usual”, 
Disarmament Forum, no. 1, UNIDIR, 2011.
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What measures are in place to ensure staff are aware of or subscribe • 
to national regulations?
Such questions, which would most logically come from a national focal 
point of the state under review and/or the review team, are likely to have 
a greater response than non-governmental or academic inquiries of a 
similar nature and stimulate the process of building relations between the 
diplomatic community of practice and the scientific community in states 
subscribing to a peer-review process. The results could build a picture of 
whether any of the discussion on topics such as biosecurity or codes of 
conduct at the international level are trickling down to the local level and 
whether there are things at the local level that other states parties can 
learn from. 
Clearly, for some countries with extensive biotechnology industry with 
several hundred facilities, there would be major logistical difficulties in 
trying to elicit, let alone collect and collate, information in the event there 
was a wide response. In other countries there may well be no response 
at all to enquiries. Nonetheless this could be an additional component 
of the peer-review process that some states might be willing to test out 
further and there is little to lose through launching such an inquiry. 
Optional addition 2—Open forum for questions 
A second possible addition that could be developed at this stage is 
the creation of some form of online forum in which interested parties 
could submit additional questions for consideration by the peer-review 
team in order to enhance transparency and perhaps build greater 
confidence among the public. Recall that the ENSREG model included 
an “opportunity to submit suggestions via the internet to be considered 
in the peer-review process”.167 This process could provide an additional 
level of scrutiny through a process of societal checks and balances and 
could encourage states to provide a more detailed account of activities 
and enhance public confidence. 
167 See “Public engagement”, <www.ensreg.eu/EU-Stress-Tests/Public-
engagement>.
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ON-SITE TRANSPARENCY VISITS
On-site transparency visits could be employed as part of an optional 
biosafety and biosecurity module for the BTWC peer-review mechanism 
and would have a very different objective to “comparable inspections 
under other arms control agreements”.168 Transparency visits would not 
be designed to assess compliance with the prohibitions of the BTWC 
per se, nor would they involve activities such as on-site sampling. Rather 
they would be used to assess “compliance with the … obligations 
of the convention”.169 More specifically such visits would provide an 
understanding of how compliance with obligations to undertake biosecurity 
and biosafety measures at the national level functions in practice.
The prospect of reviving the concept of “visits” in the BTWC context 
may cause an allergic reaction among some seasoned followers of the 
Convention. However, it is worth recalling that states, such as the United 
States, are already inviting a few states parties to the Convention to tour 
biodefence facilities,170 and that this sort of visit has become standard 
practice in other sectors, such as nuclear safety, seemingly because of 
the role such reviews play as a form of quality control.171 For example, 
in a 2010 IRRS review of the United States, a team comprised of 
representatives from 14 IAEA member states visited “NRC Region I Office; 
Limerick nuclear power plant in Limerick, Pennsylvania; Salem nuclear 
power plant in Hancock Bridge, New Jersey; the Headquarters Operations 
Centre during an emergency exercise”;172 in the same year another IRRS 
team conducted a technical visit to assess the safety regulation of the 
Iranian Bushehr nuclear power plant.173 
Moreover, since the collapse of the protocol negotiations it is likely that 
industry, or at least larger biotechnology companies, has become more 
168 United Kingdom, The Role and Objectives of Information Visits, document 
BWC/AD HOC GROUP/21, 13 July 1995, para. 9. 
169 As phrased by Lennane; R. Lennane, “Verification for the BTWC: if not the 
protocol, then what?”, Disarmament Forum, no. 1, UNIDIR, 2011, p. 41.
170 US Department of State, Remarks at the 7th Biological and Toxin Weapons 
Convention Review Conference, document 2011/T56-17, 7 December 2011. 
171 See IAEA, The Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) Mission to the United 
States of America, document IAEA-NS-IRRS-2010/02, 2010.
172 Ibid., p. 7.
173 See IAEA, International Experts Conclude IAEA Peer Review of Iran’s Safety 
Regulation of Bushehr NPP, press release 2010/03, 2 March 2010.
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accustomed to visits and external audits conducted by third parties, 
not least to comply and achieve certification with health and safety 
or environmental best practice. Certainly visits are performed as part 
of the process of certification for OHSAS (Occupational Health and 
Safety Assessment Series) 18001, which deals with areas such as hazard 
identification and risk assessment, whereas the initial registration to ISO 
14001, which provides a global standard for environmental performance, 
involves a two-stage process, including a document review and a site 
visit.174 In addition to visits by auditors from companies accredited to 
certify compliance with these types of standards, private sector companies 
also share information on accident and ill-health data as well as best 
practice. A good example of this is provided by the Pharmaceutical Safety 
Group, which includes representation from a significant number of 
large pharmaceutical companies. Although sensitivities over commercial 
secrecy will doubtless remain, as one experienced industry representative 
pointed out, “industry is already accustomed to peer-review and perhaps 
developing this into a more formal interview/on-site observation process 
would not be that difficult”.175
Nonetheless, visits, at least facility visits, could raise a number of issues 
including “the duration of site visits, conditions of access, site definition, 
recording conditions, vaccination requirements, the number of facilities to 
be visited and team size” and would almost certainly require “Candid and 
credible accounts” of the purpose of the facility, the agents it worked with, 
and the relevant safety and security measures in place at a site so that an 
evaluation could be conducted.176 
Selecting a facility or facilities could prove difficult, not least given the 
explosion in biotech facilities around the globe over the last two decades. 
Concentrating on BSL-4 (the highest containment level) and biodefence 
facilities would be a logical starting point. Moreover, unlike the concept 
of visits under the protocol negotiations, the purpose of peer-review 
visits to facilities would be to assess inter alia safety and security practices 
and they would only be initiated at the behest of the state under review. 
174 See “Certification to ISO 14001 Environmental Management”, <www.
bsigroup.com/iso-14001-environmental-management/Certification-for-ISO-
14001>.
175 Personal correspondence. 
176 D. Kelly, “The Trilateral Agreement: lessons for biological weapons verification”, 
in T. Findlay and O. Meier (eds.), Verification Yearbook 2002, VERTIC, 2002, 
p. 95. 
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Certainly, in accordance with the French vision, “the States concerned 
would be involved in every stage of the process: each assessment would 
be undertaken upon their request”.177 Similar to the IAEA model, facilities 
could be selected by the state under review and the role of the host in 
selecting facilities would allow them to focus attention on facilities and 
issues that were of greatest concern and, correspondingly, could most 
benefit from a set of recommendations offered by the international 
experts.
None of these issues should prove insurmountable, particularly if a pilot 
process were initiated from the bottom up by a collective of committed 
states and if it maintained respect for the reviewed state’s sovereignty. 
There could be a number of benefits of reviewing through visits how 
compliance with the obligations of the Convention functions in practice:
it could help in sharing best practice in a range of different areas from • 
outbreak response to biosafety regulation; 
it would provide an indication of the practical challenges that some • 
states may be experiencing; 
it could build a link between the local and the international or more • 
specifically between the BTWC and the biosafety officer in cases 
where one does not already exist; 
it would provide an opportunity to confirm baseline data submissions • 
for any errors or omissions; and 
in some cases it could facilitate education, awareness-raising, • 
engagement, and outreach through interaction between the visiting 
team and the facility staff. 
ANALYSIS AND DRAFTING PHASE
Subsequent to the visit phase there would need to be a period of reflection 
in which the data provided by the state party (or acquired through 
interviews, observations, or surveys depending on what was agreed), 
could be assessed against some form of pre-agreed baseline criteria for 
compliance, taking into consideration the country context. The report 
could also include some form of recommendations where identified 
177 France, A Peer Review Mechanism for the Biological Weapons Convention: 
Enhancing Confidence in National Implementation and International 
Cooperation, document BWC/CONF.VII/WP.28, 13 December 2011, 
para. 10(d).
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and necessary. This process should culminate in the creation of a draft 
BTWC peer-review team report comprising of a factual report from the 
assessment, and recommendations where necessary along with all other 
necessary details. 
There is much to learn from other organizations in the development of the 
report format. The FATF, for example, contains a number of key sections 
with material divided into description, analysis, recommendations, 
and comments. The descriptive section provides a factual summary of 
what measures are in place in country, sometimes using direct citations 
or summaries. The analysis section reviews what is in place, pointing 
to any gaps but equally highlighting strengths of the system.178 Recent 
examples of IRRS reports go into considerable detail. The report of the 
2012 IRRS mission to Sweden, for example, includes several substantive 
sections covering the areas addressed under the IRRS review, such as 
“responsibilities and functions of the regulatory body”, “inspection 
and enforcement processes”, “development and content of regulations 
and guides”, and “emergency preparedness and response”, but also 
information on the basis, objective, and scope of the peer-review process; 
list of participants; IAEA reference material used for the review; site visits; 
recommendations, suggestions, and good practices; and the mission 
programme.179
THE CONSULTATION AND CLARIFICATION PHASE
In the consultation and clarification phase, the reviewing team would 
meet with representatives of the state under review and discuss the 
findings and recommendations. The phase would thus provide a mutually 
beneficial space: for reviewers it could present an opportunity to clarify 
and consult on any outstanding issues and ensure the accuracy of the 
information; for governments it could provide an opportunity to clarify 
any omissions or mistakes in information submitted to the peer-review 
team, to react to the reviewer’s findings and recommendations, and to 
put forward its own views on the identified shortcomings. There could 
be an added advantage to following the FATF model and encouraging 
participation from “experienced experts from different delegations, taking 
178 See FATF, AML/CFT Evaluations and Assessments: Handbook for Countries and 
Assessors, 2009. 
179 See IAEA, Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) Mission to Sweden, 
document AIEA-NS-IRRS-2012/01, 2012.
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into account regional balance, and from different expertise (legal, financial, 
law enforcement)”.180 Such experienced experts could play a valuable role 
in resolving differences and facilitating agreement upon a draft report. 
In cases where this was not possible because of strong disagreement, 
an APRM-type model could be applied and government responses and 
counterarguments could be appended to the peer-review report.181 
Two possible additional components to the consultation and clarification 
phase could be envisaged. First, one addition could be the development 
of deadlines for rectification of any problems or weaknesses identified. 
This would add a time frame to the peer pressure, particularly if coupled 
with the prospect of a follow-on review to evaluate progress in rectifying 
gaps and issues identified in the peer-review process. Second, in order 
to incentivize participation, it could be useful to marry peer-review 
recommendations with concrete offers of support from states parties. 
It is worth recalling here that the Seventh Review Conference agreed to 
“Establish a database system to facilitate requests for and offers of exchange 
of assistance and cooperation among States Parties”. Under this system: 
States Parties are invited, individually or together with other states 
or international organizations, to submit on a voluntary basis to the 
Implementation Support Unit any requirements, needs or offers for 
assistance, including in terms of equipment, materials and scientific 
and technological information regarding the use of biological and toxin 
agents for peaceful purposes. The ISU will establish and administer a 
database, open to all States Parties, where these requests and offers 
will be stored.
States Parties may use the database to match offers with requests for 
assistance and then make their own further arrangements.182
Such an approach may thus facilitate the provision of assistance where 
required and may encourage interest from developing countries 
committed to building capacity in inter alia biosafety, biosecurity, public 
health response, or law enforcement capabilities. Alternatively it is possible 
180 See the overview of the FATF mutual evaluation procedure, above.
181 See “Stages of APRM”, <http://new.uneca.org/aprm/StagesAPRM.aspx>. 
182 Seventh Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the 
Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological 
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, Final Document 
of the Seventh Review Conference, document BWC/CONF.VII/7, 13 January 
2012, paras. 17–19. 
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that support for implementing recommendations from a peer-review 
process could be acquired through the European Union’s CBRN Centres 
of Excellence, which deal with the mitigation of deliberate, accidental and 
natural chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) risks. Either 
way it will be important to ensure that in circumstances where states are 
recognized as facing difficulties and subject to criticisms in a peer-review 
process, they are provided with the requisite attention needed to resolve 
the problems identified.
PLENARY DISCUSSION AND PUBLICATION OF REVIEW
In order to maximize the value of a peer-review process, the results would 
need to be formally presented and shared with others. This could be done 
through: 
a closed regional-group-type meeting on the sidelines of a BTWC • 
meeting, an approach that could limit the sharing of results to 
participating states that had agreed to be reviewed; 
the allocation of segments of intersessional meetings as closed • 
“accountability sessions” realizing aspects of the accountability concept 
proposed by Canada in 2006183 or in a working session of the Standing 
Agenda Item (SAI) on strengthening national implementation, which 
could be incorporated through the agreement under agenda item B, 
which includes “voluntary exchange of information among States 
Parties on their national implementation, enforcement of national 
legislation, strengthening of national institutions and coordination 
among national law enforcement institutions”;184 or
presentation by states parties of the results in a public plenary session. • 
Each of these options has distinct advantages and disadvantages. The closed 
regional-group-type approach would limit the sharing of information only 
183 Canada, Accountability Framework, document BWC/CONF.VI/WP.1, 
20 October 2006, p. 3.
184 Seventh Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the 
Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological 
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, Final Document 
of the Seventh Review Conference, document BWC/CONF.VII/7, 13 January 
2012, para. 24(b).
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to participating states—this could serve as an incentive to participate,185 
however it would weaken the value of information in building best practice 
and exchanging lessons learned. The resurrection of a closed variant of 
the accountability session or a working session of the SAI would enable 
the sharing of information with all states parties, something that could 
add a layer of peer pressure as well as of exchanging lessons learned and 
best practice. As Lennane has noted, sharing results with all states parties 
“would do much more to build confidence in compliance”,186 whereas 
the use of an open plenary session would allow exchange of information 
on best practice and more importantly subject a state to additional public 
and press scrutiny. This latter option, in which participating states would 
voluntarily and publicly expose themselves to criticism, may prove entirely 
alien to those more accustomed to disarmament diplomacy, yet it does 
have precedents elsewhere and would significantly reinforce the value 
of the peer-review process. Moreover, if coupled with the provision of 
guaranteed assistance to rectify weaknesses identified by third parties, 
there would be tangible benefits. A final approach could be to combine 
different types of meetings and share different levels of information with 
different audiences. 
FOLLOW-UP
Based on the existing models of peer review identified in this survey, 
there could be a number of benefits to building in some form of follow-
up process as a means to ensure the peer-review process has enduring 
value beyond the presentation of findings. This could be undertaken 
through the FATF’s more aggressive model of applying “graduated peer 
pressure on non-complying Members”187 or alternatively through the 
IRRS follow-up review model. In the case of the latter, a follow-up peer 
review could be scheduled with the objective of “review[ing] the progress 
in implementing improvements resulting from recommendations and 
suggestions made in the [peer-review report] and reviewing the areas of 
significant regulatory changes since then”.188 In the case of the former, 
185 R. Lennane, “Verification for the BTWC: if not the protocol, then what?”, 
Disarmament Forum, no. 1, UNIDIR, 2011.
186 Ibid., p. 46. 
187 K.L. Gardner, “Fighting terrorism the FATF way”, Global Governance, vol. 13, 
no. 3, 2007, p. 333.
188 IAEA, Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) Follow-up Mission to the 
Commonwealth Government of Australia, document IAEA-NS-IRRS-2011/06, 
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and depending on the results of the peer-review process, the state under 
review could, in cases where only minor requirements were identified, 
simply report back to states parties at the end of a fixed period. In cases 
where more serious deficiencies were identified, states could develop a 
plan to rectify weaknesses—perhaps using the database mechanism to 
determine a suitable provider of assistance—and then begin the process 
of rectifying weaknesses before reporting back within a fixed time frame. 
In cases where what the FATF calls “enhanced follow-up” were required, 
additional measures could be applied such as a high-level mission to 
highlight certain issues or the issuance of a statement to the effect that the 
participant remains insufficiently in compliance with the obligations of the 
Convention. 
REFLECTIONS ON THE AMBITIOUS APPROACH TO PEER REVIEW
The peer-review mechanism for the BTWC outlined here clearly falls 
short of verification as often understood in the context of the protocol 
negotiations, yet it would provide a “structured and systematic means of 
providing an increased level of assurance that States Parties are complying 
with the … obligations of the convention”.189 It would also have the added 
advantage of ensuring that some form of consultation and clarification 
process takes place in which the reviewers can check what has been 
submitted; clarify any ambiguities and examine the situation from different 
perspectives; provide an understanding of how implementation operates 
in practice; provide a means for sharing best practice; and, through the 
plenary process, serve to apply additional peer pressure through the 
publication of results and recommendations and timescales. 
A BTWC peer-review process would require a number of prerequisite 
components in order to function. This would include as a minimum a 
peer-review team, a baseline of data, some form of criteria from which to 
gauge performance in potentially a number of different areas, incentives 
to participate, a credible follow-up process, and the cultivation of political 
support.
2011, p. 11. 
189 R. Lennane, “Verification for the BTWC: if not the protocol, then what?”, 
Disarmament Forum, no. 1, UNIDIR, 2011, p. 41.
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PREREQUISITES FOR BTWC PEER REVIEW
This section discusses the prerequisites for peer review, drawing on 
experiences both outside and inside the BTWC. 
“PEERS” 
The first ingredient required would be a peer-review team comprised of 
“qualified assessors with practical, relevant experience”.190 There could 
be some scope for seeking to contract third-party private sector auditors 
with expertise in the required areas to conduct a peer review. Such an 
approach could engender a more objective assessment and perhaps 
exploit the flexible and nimble nature of the private sector. Moreover, as 
noted above, the biotech industry is increasingly accustomed to third-
party assessments whereas civil society organizations such as VERTIC have 
proved adept at providing legal assessment and assistance. States may be 
more comfortable bringing in experience and expertise from academics 
for some of the additional models, for example when dealing with issues 
such as outreach or awareness-raising. 
However, with most issue areas, a peer-review process is likely to have 
more weight if it is undertaken by individuals nominated by—and 
representative of—states parties. Such an approach would also appear 
to be consistent with other models such as the OECD approach to peer 
review, in which “Generally, the choice of examiners is based on a system 
of rotation among the member States, although the particular knowledge 
of a country relevant to the review may be taken into account”.191 
In the case of the basic peer-review package, the team could be selected 
from a small pool of legal experts nominated by states parties yet acting 
independently as objective reviewers. However, in the case of a more 
ambitious approach, the peer-review process could require a much more 
diverse set of expertise capable of making an assessment of, inter alia, 
legislation and regulations and their enforcement; biosafety and biosecurity 
190 FATF, AML/CFT Evaluations and Assessments: Handbook for Countries and 
Assessors, 2009, p. 6.
191 F. Pagani, Peer Review: A Tool for Co-operation and Change—An Analysis of 
an OECD Working Method, OECD document SG/LEG(2002)1, 11 September 
2002, para. 19.
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in the laboratory; outreach, awareness-raising, and education; and public 
health detection and response. 
In order to maximize the sharing of best practice and satisfy requirements 
of geographical representation, the peer-review team would need 
to be drawn from qualified experts from across the globe or at least 
representatives of the breadth of states parties involved. This could also 
have a number of advantages in the BTWC context. First, diversity of 
reviewer backgrounds would help ensure that the peer-review team did 
not simply undertake “narrow comparisons” with one state or regional 
solution to issues,192 and instead took into consideration the context in 
which a solution is applied. Second, a diversity of backgrounds could lend 
any peer-review system broader credibility within the BTWC and avoid 
any misperceptions of or suspicions towards peer review. 
Equally, if not more importantly, considerations of diversity would help to 
generate a team of reviewers who were as much as possible independent, 
balanced, and objective. These factors contribute to ensuring the review 
process is credible, which in turn can legitimize the process and any 
recommendations that flow from it. Based on the OECD experience, 
Pagani has stated that “There is a strong linkage between the credibility 
of the process and its capacity of influence. To assure this credibility, the 
approach that the examiners—with the help of the Secretariat—take in the 
review must be objective, fair and consistent”.193 Clear guidelines for the 
peer-review process could go some way towards ensuring objectivity and 
consistency as could the presentation of results to the broader community 
by peer-review team members in some form of an accountability session, 
something that could hone the thoughts and conclusions of the team. 
BASELINE OF COUNTRY INFORMATION
The development of any peer-review mechanism will require a baseline 
of information upon which to conduct an assessment. The breadth and 
depth of information required will clearly be influenced by the state 
party’s selection of modules for peer review, and this would define the 
objectives of the exercise. In circumstances where a state party selected 
a basic package, the principle requirements could include materials such 
192 FATF, Third Round of AML/CFT Mutual Evaluations: Process and Procedures, 
2009, para. 19. 
193 Ibid., para. 23.
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as relevant, updated national legislation and regulations in the working 
language, a summary description of the purpose of measures, past case 
histories where available, the criminal procedures used in the prosecution 
of relevant acts, a description of any activities undertaken to raise 
awareness in the legal community or among law enforcement officers, 
and activities intended to improve interagency cooperation. In seeking 
to identify the materials required for national legislation, there would be 
great merit in looking at the Canadian proposal at the 2010 Meeting of 
States Parties entitled National Implementation of the BTWC: Compliance 
Assessment: A Concept Paper. The proposal goes into considerable depth 
and suggests that: 
each State Party would submit to the ISU … a detailed description 
of national legislation and regulations supporting the national 
implementation of the BTWC, including those that cover the oversight 
of human, animal and plant pathogens. This detailed description could 
include very specific section-by-section analysis of how the legislation/
regulations work, the scope of the legislation/regulations … and the 
penalties associated with contraventions. 
In addition to the analysis of the national implementation legislation, 
each submitting State Party would also submit a detailed description 
of how the program was implemented on a national level. This 
could include process flow diagrams, organizational charts of the 
implementing program, showing clear lines of reporting, process and 
standard operating procedure descriptions, as well as clear indications 
of the inspection program, frequency of inspections and how major 
and minor non-compliances are handled.194 
Security Council resolution 1540 could also be a useful guide in the 
collection and collation of all relevant documentation, although in many 
cases 1540 submissions will need to be checked for any updates and 
complemented with supporting documentation.
Should a state party opt for all modules, a much broader and more 
comprehensive set of materials will be required. Examples of the sorts of 
materials that could be useful in conducting a peer review are outlined 
below.
194 Canada, National Implementation of the BTWC: Compliance Assessment: A 
Concept Paper, document BWC/MSP/2010/WP.3/Rev.1, 7 December 2010, 
paras. 4–5. 
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EXAMPLES OF MATERIALS TO INFORM ADDITIONAL MODULES
OF A BTWC PEER-REVIEW MECHANISM 
International cooperation and assistance
Details of international funding activities of relevance to the • 
Convention
Transnationally funded projects • 
Bibliometric analysis of academic transnational coauthorship • 
Export control denials• 
There are a number of examples of the sorts of details that could be useful 
in the Seventh Review Conference background information document 
submitted by the ISU on Implementation of Article X of the Convention.195 
The module could perhaps benefit from third-party analysis of technology 
transfer mechanisms. 
Export control 
Background on biotech industry and imports/exports in country • 
Up-to-date legislation and regulatory mechanisms in the working • 
language 
Procedural code for export control violations• 
Details of export denials• 
Past history of export violations linked to the country • 
Export control lists used• 
Catch-all control criteria if available• 
Licensing procedures• 
Evidence of industry outreach and awareness-raising• 
Mechanisms to deal with intangible controls• 
A better understanding of how export controls work in practice could 
benefit from interviews with customs officials and export control officers 
as well as observation of implementation of measures in practice.
195 See ISU, Implementation of Article X of the Convention, document BWC/
CONF.VII/INF.8, 23 November 2011.
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Laboratory biosecurity and biosafety 
Details on facility or facilities purpose, staffing levels, containment • 
facility size
Safety/security incident report or equivalent• 
Details on personnel reliability measures• 
Outline of physical security• 
Details on measures in place to build information technology security• 
Details on measures for material control and accountability• 
Details on measures for material transfer security • 
Details on programme management• 
As noted above, building an understanding of biosecurity and biosafety 
measures could benefit from access to staff for interviews and on-site 
visits to observe mechanisms in practice. 
Outreach, codes, education, and engagement
Summary of government initiatives in the field of outreach, codes, • 
education, and engagement
Description of initiatives undertaken by the Academy of Science or • 
equivalent
Relevant obligations in funding criteria• 
Law enforcement outreach initiatives• 
As noted above this module could benefit from some form of stakeholder 
survey to more accurately capture the extent of outreach, codes, 
education, and engagement related activities. 
Disease outbreak detection and response capacity 
Description of disease detection and reporting process• 
Description of response plans in place• 
National epidemic disease intelligence• 
Details of education or training programme for first responders• 
There is likely to be a wealth of other information that could be derived 
from national interactions with International Health Regulations (IHR) 
and there could be some benefit from engaging with IHR focal points.
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Oversight mechanisms
Guidelines or advisory documents used in biodefence and/or high-• 
containment laboratories
Selected reports or minutes from oversight committee (or equivalent) • 
discussions 
In the absence of declarations, confidence-building measures (CBMs) and 
the various national reports on aspects of compliance with the Convention 
submitted for review conferences could serve as a useful means of 
generating a baseline of data from which to conduct a peer review. In many 
cases the information is likely to be readily available for those states that 
have been particularly active and diligent in the submission of materials. 
Historically, CBMs have, however, been of marginal utility because of the 
low participation rate and the poor quality of submissions.196 “The majority 
of states consistently note nothing or nothing new to declare on the forms 
they submit, which means little information is actually exchanged in 
practice”.197 This is a particular concern in relation to biodefence activity, 
as required under CBM Form A2: “in every year, since the forms were 
modified following the Third Review Conference in 1991, less than half of 
the States Parties submitting the form indicate that they have something to 
declare”.198 
Accordingly participation in a peer-review process will require the 
completion of up-to-date CBM forms, but most likely a much more detailed 
account of national implementation will be required. For the purposes of a 
peer-review system it is probably not worth reviving multilateral discussion 
on the specifics and modalities of CBMs, but rather those states that are 
interested should be encouraged to provide a more detailed submission 
based on a provisional set of guidelines agreed by participating states. This 
could be revised subsequently as any process evolved. 
In seeking to develop guidelines, it is notable that the APRM, the FATF 
mutual evaluations, the OECD DAC reviews, and the IAEA IRRS assessment 
196 I. Hunger and N. Isla, “Confidence-building needs transparency: an analysis 
of the BTWC’s confidence-building measures”, Disarmament Forum, no. 3, 
UNIDIR, 2006, p. 27.
197 See F. Lentzos, “Reaching a tipping point: strengthening BTWC confidence-
building measures”, Disarmament Diplomacy, no. 89, 2008. 
198 Ibid.
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all include some form of questionnaire for completion in the preparatory 
phase. In the case of the FATF the questionnaire is used to: 
facilitate the preparation of a response, which can provide key 
information for the on-site visit and form the basis for the initial 
outline draft of the [Mutual Evaluation Report] to be prepared by the 
Secretariat. It does not ask detailed questions, but countries must set 
out fully how they meet each Methodology criterion.199 
On the other hand, the APRM uses the questionnaire inter alia “to provide 
participating countries with a format that can serve as a checklist to 
determine whether the various stakeholders participating in the process 
have responded to their concerns”.200 
Finally, there will be a need to ensure all materials are translated into one 
target language. The ENSREG experience highlights some of the challenges 
with language. As Greenpeace remarked on the nuclear operator reports 
that were publicized, “Many of the published operator reports are only 
available in the local language—in Belgium, French-speaking Wallonians 
are not even able to read the report on Doel and Dutch-speaking Flemish 
the one on Tihange”.201 In this regard, it will need to be taken into account 
that the collection, collation, translation, and submission of materials to 
the reviewers will take time. 
BASELINE CRITERIA FOR COMPLIANCE WITH AND/OR
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BTWC
The development of any peer-review system requires a second category 
of data, specifically, some form of principles, criteria or standards from 
which to conduct an assessment. In the case of the IRRS peer reviews, 
IAEA standards, such as General Safety Requirements Part 1: Governmental, 
Legal and Regulatory Framework for Safety, are used as a benchmark for 
national regulatory policies. In the case of the FATF, national legislation is 
assessed in relation to the “FATF 40 + 9 Recommendations”. 
199 FATF, Third Round of AML/CFT Mutual Evaluations: Process and Procedures, 
2009, p. 5. 
200 APRM Secretariat, Revised Country Self-Assessment Questionnaire for the 
African Peer Review Mechanism, 2012, <http://aprm-au.org/sites/default/files/
Revised%20APRM%20Eng%20Questionnaire%206%20Aug%2012.pdf>.
201 J. Haverkamp, Can the Stress Tests Be Saved from Greenwash?, Greenpeace, 
2012, p. 2, <www.ensreg.eu/sites/default/files/13-Greenpeace-Haverkamp-
paper.pdf>.
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In the case of the BTWC there is no clear single criterion upon which 
to benchmark success, nor is there likely to be much scope for a one-
size-fits-all standard that would satisfy the vast differences in resources, 
cultures, and contexts of the BTWC states parties. As the French working 
paper states, “it would be impossible to apply a fully standardized, 
comprehensive system to all the States involved”.202 One approach could 
be to look to the Chemical Weapons Convention and seek to develop a 
framework along the lines of the process that resulted in the agreement 
around “key legislative measures”. An alternative could be look to the IAEA 
model in which a series of technical meetings on specific issues culminates 
in the development of a series of safety or security standards. There is merit 
to both approaches, although the recent difficulties in achieving agreement 
on small passages of consensus text in the final reports of meetings of state 
parties suggests that both approaches are likely to be difficult. 
Moreover, developing criteria is probably unnecessary as there is a wealth 
of information already available to states parties that could be applied 
to the purpose of gauging peer reviews. Outside the BTWC there are a 
number of international standards. In terms of biosecurity and biosafety, 
for example, the European Committee for Standardisation Workshop 
Agreement (CWA) 15793 “Laboratory Biorisk Management Standard” 
could be developed to serve as a basis for assessment. Alternatively the 
1540 Committee has developed national reporting matrices that contain a 
number of activities for which national legislation is required. This serves 
“as a reference tool to examine the status of implementation of Security 
Council Resolution 1540”,203 and these cover a number of important areas 
including accounting for, securing, and physically protecting weapon-
related materials, border security, and export controls. 
Of greater relevance is that over the course of the last decade the 
BTWC forum has produced a plethora of materials including “common 
understandings” agreed by consensus, chairpersons’ synthesis reports and 
a pool of working papers produced by states parties. In fact, one of the 
major advantages of the extensive discussions on national implementation 
during the first two intersessional processes (particularly through meetings 
202 France, A Peer Review Mechanism for the Biological Weapons Convention: 
Enhancing Confidence in National Implementation and International 
Cooperation, document BWC/CONF.VII/WP.28, 13 December 2011, para. 9. 
203 See “The 1540 matrix”, <www.un.org/en/sc/1540/national-implementation/
matrix.shtml>. 
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in 2003, 2007, and 2008) is that states parties to the BTWC already have 
a clearer idea of what is required in terms of national implementation 
and compliance under the Convention. In this sense it is the process of 
combining and refining materials to develop some form of guide. As the 
French working paper remarked, “The results achieved during the last 
intersessional process still need to be consolidated and discussed further, 
but they already form a solid basis for consensus building regarding 
implementation procedures”.204
While the development of assessment criteria does therefore not require 
starting de novo, consideration would need to be given to both how 
an evaluation would be conducted and how any system could provide 
sufficient scalability and flexibility in the expectations placed upon states 
parties. What is expected in terms of national implementation of the 
BTWC in the United States differs considerably from what is expected in 
Tuvalu, for example. It was noted at a recent Chatham House meeting: 
All leading countries now have effective counter-terrorism legislation in 
place to control such activities. In the UK, this was provided in the Anti-
terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001. Legislation often promotes the 
use of highly secure physical containment of biological threat agents—
new buildings, new high-tech security systems and personnel training. 
However, these are associated with high costs. It is highly unlikely that 
developing nations will possess the necessary resources, and many 
have poor health infrastructure and regulatory capacity.205
Scalable and flexible criteria for reviewers to gauge success is to some 
degree applied in a number of the peer-review models outlined above. 
In the FATF model the guidance is clear that “Assessors must be cognisant 
that different countries may adopt different approaches to meeting the 
FATF standards, and so need to be open and flexible, and seek to avoid 
narrow comparisons with their own national solutions”.206 Whereas, in the 
context of the IRRS: 
204 France, A Peer Review Mechanism for the Biological Weapons Convention: 
Enhancing Confidence in National Implementation and International 
Cooperation, document BWC/CONF.VII/WP.28, 13 December 2011, para. 3.
205 Chatham House, Meeting Summary—Safe and Secure Biomaterials: Matching 
Resources to Reality, 2012, p. 3. 
206 FATF, Third Round of AML/CFT Mutual Evaluations: Process and Procedures, 
2009, p. 7. 
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The IRRS process recognizes that organizational structure and 
regulatory processes vary from country to country depending on 
national legal and administrative systems, the size and structure of 
the nuclear and radiation protection programme, financial resources 
available to the regulatory body, social customs and cultural traditions. 
The IRRS has been constructed to allow for all such variations within a 
single integrated review service.
… It is performance-oriented in that it accepts different approaches to 
the organization and practices of a regulatory framework and regulatory 
body that contribute to a strong national nuclear and radiation safety 
regime.207
Thinking through how expectations can be developed on a sliding scale 
will be important. It may be more constructive to steer a BTWC peer-
review system away from a checklist approach that ticks the box indicating 
whether states have x and y in place and perhaps more towards some 
form of performance-oriented evaluation that elicits information based on 
the question “how do you do this?”.
INCENTIVES TO PARTICIPATE 
Perhaps of greatest importance in building a peer-review mechanism for 
the BTWC would be some form of incentives to participate. Certainly in 
the context of the APRM process incentives were highlighted in one civil 
society commentary: 
The truth is that a large number of countries got into Nepad and 
APRM because there was a promise of support and resources, and the 
APRM stood as a very good process to improve governance, and at 
the end of that process, there was a promise of resources. … What 
the implication might be, that those countries that have not yet gone 
into the APRM, now realising that those that have gone into it and 
might not be benefiting, might, in fact, decide for their own sake, but 
prompted by this reality, to shy away from the APRM.208
Participation is likely to be predicated on either some form of compelling 
requirement to engage or because participation is somehow advantageous. 
It is unlikely that any peer-review system could—or indeed should—be 
207 See “The IRRS process”, <www-ns.iaea.org/reviews/rs-reviews.asp>. 
208 South African Institute of International Affairs, APRM Lessons Learned: Report 
on the SAIIA Conference For Civil Society, Practitioners and Researchers, 2006, 
p. 30, <http://saiia.org.za/images/upload/APRM%20Lessons%20Learnt.pdf>. 
65
made legally binding as this runs counter to the “soft law” character of a 
peer-review mechanism. It does however mean that there will be limits to 
any hope of a compelling requirement for participation. Nor is it likely that 
the reward of prestige or being certified as “compliant” with the obligations 
of the BTWC would be sufficient compensation for involvement; rather, it 
is likely to require something more substantial. 
It is interesting to look at the drivers of organizational-level conformity 
with standards such as the CWA 15793 Laboratory Biorisk Management 
Standard. Burns and De Kesel are worth quoting at length: 
The most obvious benefit for organisations implementing CWA 
15793 include improved biosafety and biosecurity performance 
ensuring protection for employees and the wider community, as well 
as preventing loss, theft, and misuse of biological materials with dual 
use potential. Compliance with the standard furthermore avoids direct 
financial costs associated with business interruption, ensures conformity 
with legal requirements and helps to avert penalties or litigation. An 
additional, yet significant benefit concerns the preservation of an 
organisation’s reputation. 
An organisation that obtained formal certification as meeting the 
requirements of the CWA may be able to negotiate lower insurance 
premiums and reduce the number of interventions by regulators.209
Many of these points can be transposed from the local or organizational 
level to the national level. Certainly, improved biosafety and biosecurity 
performance can improve protection for citizens as well as prevent loss, 
theft, and misuse of biological materials. 
However, there could be two key advantages to participation. The first 
and most obvious incentive to participate in such as system would be 
guaranteed access to the resources and support needed to resolve any 
technical problems or gaps identified in implementation of the BTWC. 
There are a number of mechanisms with which a peer-review system 
could be linked to deliver the necessary support to rectify weaknesses 
identified. It is worth recalling here that the Seventh Review Conference 
agreed to “Establish a database system to facilitate requests for and offers 
209 G. Burns and T. De Kesel, “Can biorisk management standards contribute 
to non-proliferation of biological weapons?”, in J.P. Zanders (ed.), Setting 
a Standard for Stakeholdership: Industry Contribution to a Strengthened 
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, Egmont Paper 52, Egmont Institute, 
2011, p. 27. 
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of exchange of assistance and cooperation among States Parties”. Under 
this system: 
States Parties are invited, individually or together with other states 
or international organizations, to submit on a voluntary basis to the 
Implementation Support Unit any requirements, needs or offers for 
assistance, including in terms of equipment, materials and scientific 
and technological information regarding the use of biological and toxin 
agents for peaceful purposes. The ISU will establish and administer a 
database, open to all States Parties, where these requests and offers 
will be stored.
States Parties may use the database to match offers with requests for 
assistance and then make their own further arrangements.210
Such an approach may thus facilitate the provision of assistance where 
required and may encourage interest from developing countries committed 
to building capacity in, inter alia, biosafety, biosecurity, public health 
response, or law enforcement capabilities. Alternatively it is possible that 
support for implementing recommendations from a peer-review process 
could be acquired through the EU CBRN Centres of Excellence. Either 
way it will be important to ensure that in circumstances where states are 
recognized as facing difficulties and subject to criticism in a peer-review 
process, they are provided with the requisite attention and support needed 
to resolve the problems identified. While such an approach may appear 
logical, it could be vulnerable to political misperceptions and it would 
be important to make clear from the very beginning that a peer-review 
process was not intended as a gateway to the provision of assistance and 
participation in international cooperation for peaceful purposes, but rather 
a means of opening channels of assistance and stimulating the provision of 
assistance and cooperation in the implementation of the obligations under 
the Convention. 
For those states that place high priority on the prevention of biological 
terrorism and warfare, a second incentive would be to have their 
implementing mechanisms subject to an expert-level peer review. Such 
a review could identify weaknesses to be rectified as well as showcase 
210 Seventh Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the 
Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological 
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, Final Document 
of the Seventh Review Conference, document BWC/CONF.VII/7, 13 January 
2012, paras. 17–19.
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robust practices. Both are important in circumstances where bioterrorism 
is deemed a high priority, the former as it would strengthen the measures 
in place to prevent bioterrorism, the latter as it could dissuade terrorists. 
CREDIBLE FOLLOW-UP PROCESSES
Related to the issue of incentives is establishing a credible follow-up 
process that, in instances where states were falling behind expectations, 
“graduated peer pressure”211 could be applied. Under such a mechanism, 
those participating states with major deficiencies would be encouraged to 
report back to the ISU or a subsequent meeting of states parties after a 
certain period of time and provide an account of whether the necessary 
changes had been made to rectify weaknesses identified and implement 
the recommendations contained within the peer-review report. In cases 
where reviewed states failed to address deficiencies, the review team 
could consider whether further assistance was needed, due to a genuine 
lack of resources necessary to comply, or whether enhanced pressure 
would be required. Drawing on the FATF follow-up process, a number 
of incremental steps could be applied, ranging from a letter, a high-level 
mission to highlight certain issues, or even a formal statement to the 
effect that the participating state is insufficiently in compliance with the 
obligations of the BTWC. 
BUILDING POLITICAL SUPPORT 
Perhaps the most important, yet the most difficult ingredient in building a 
peer-review process will be the generation of necessary political support to 
move things forward. While the traditional multilaterally negotiated “all-
or-nothing consensus-based approach” to agreement in the BTWC may 
be favoured by some states, it would be both unnecessary and unwise. A 
much more efficient and effective approach—at least in the first instance—
would be to begin by seeking support from an interested collective of states 
parties willing to commit to a pilot process and volunteer themselves to be 
peer reviewed. As much has been suggested both in the French working 
paper and the work of Lennane. The former suggested that one approach 
to the peer-review model: 
211 K.L. Gardner, “Fighting terrorism the FATF way”, Global Governance, vol. 13, 
no. 3, 2007, p. 333.
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would be for the mechanism to apply to all States parties. At first it 
could, however, be introduced for a smaller group of interested States. 
States would have an incentive to participate, since undergoing an 
assessment would bolster confidence and create a more conducive 
environment for international cooperation.212
Whereas the latter suggested a “bottom-up” approach: 
developing and implementing individual components on a small 
scale, refining and improving them in operation, gradually expanding 
participation and scope, and then—once everyone knows what is 
involved and is confident the measures work in practice—perhaps 
bringing them together into a legally binding instrument.
… there is nothing to stop a group of interested and motivated States 
Parties going further and implementing an expanded CBM or national 
declaration system among themselves. Similarly, a programme of on-
site visits to biodefence facilities could start as soon as interested States 
Parties decide and hash out some basic procedures.213 
The group could then develop a detailed methodology, begin a pilot 
process to test the feasibility of a peer-review process, and then report 
back to the states parties. 
A collective of the willing would benefit from geographical diversity for 
two key reasons. First, geographical diversity will avoid the situation 
wherein a small group of like-minded Western states do more of the same 
things and go through the process of looking at each other’s programmes 
for compliance. Second, there would be much to gain from looking at and 
learning how developing countries have created innovative mechanisms 
to implement aspects of the Convention with more limited resources than 
developed countries. 
There could be interest in a peer-review process from a number of states 
parties. Such a process would meet the needs identified in their national 
statements in the BTWC forum, as outlined below.
212 France, A Peer Review Mechanism for the Biological Weapons Convention: 
Enhancing Confidence in National Implementation and International 
Cooperation, document BWC/CONF.VII/WP.28, 13 December 2011, para. 7. 
213 R. Lennane, “Verification for the BTWC: if not the protocol, then what?”, 
Disarmament Forum, no. 1, UNIDIR, 2011, p. 49. 
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EXAMPLES OF OBJECTIVES THAT COULD BE ACHIEVED
THROUGH A PEER-REVIEW PROCESS
Canada
At present, there is no established procedure for asking questions 
or seeking clarification about a State Party’s CBM submission, other 
than through bilateral channels as per Article V. As submissions cannot 
build confidence if information is misunderstood or unclear, Canada 
proposes that States that have questions or comments about another 
country’s submission have the option to submit requests for clarification 
to the BTWC’s Implementation Support Unit (ISU), which would in 
turn engage with the relevant country to provide a response. This 
process would encourage a constructive and productive exchange on 
CBM submissions and provide a simple and accessible mechanism for 
all States Parties.214
Australia, Japan, and New Zealand
Having considered what constitutes compliance with the [BTWC], 
there would be value in the working group undertaking a conceptual 
discussion about how States Parties can better demonstrate their 
compliance with the [BTWC] and thereby enhance assurance for other 
States Parties. In this regard, the Working Group could consider:
(a) whether there is a role for CBMs or declarations in demonstrating 
compliance, and if so, whether additional information to that which is 
already requested in the current CBMs would enhance assurance of 
compliance; 
(b) whether the consultation and cooperation mechanisms under 
Article V require further development, including, for example, 
consideration of mutually agreed visits to sites of compliance concern 
… .215
European Union
State parties should be able to demonstrate compliance by means 
of information exchanges and enhanced transparency about their 
implementation activities and intentions towards compliance. This 
214 Canada, Strengthening the Existing Confidence-Building Measure Submission 
and Review Process, 2011, item V, <www.opbw.org/rev_cons/7rc/BWC_
CONF.VII_WP_Canada_E.pdf> (emphasis added).
215 Australia, Japan, and New Zealand, Proposal for a Working Group to Address 
Compliance Issues, 2011, para. 6, <www.opbw.org/rev_cons/7rc/BWC_CONF.
VII_WP_Australia-Japan-NZ1_E.pdf>.
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can be achieved by means of declarations, consultations and on-site 
activities, representing increasing levels of transparency and scrutiny, 
but also by information exchange and review during the intersessional 
process. While recognising that there is currently no consensus on the 
issue of verification, which remains a central element of the complete 
and effective disarmament and non-proliferation regime, we are willing 
to work towards identifying options that could achieve similar goals.216 
United States of America
[W]e need to bolster international confidence that all countries are 
living up to our obligations under the Convention. It is not possible, 
in our opinion, to create a verification regime that will achieve this 
goal. But we must take other steps. To begin with, we should revise 
the Convention’s annual reporting systems to ensure that each party 
is answering the right questions, such as what we are each all doing to 
guard against the misuse of biological materials. 
Countries should also take their own measures to demonstrate 
transparency. Under our new Bio-Transparency and Openness 
Initiative, we will host an international forum on health and security to 
exchange views on biological threats and discuss the evolution of U.S. 
bioresearch programs. We will underscore that commitment by inviting 
a few state parties to the Convention to tour a U.S. biodefense facility 
next year, as Ambassador van den Ijssel and the UN 1540 Committee 
did this past summer. And we will promote dialogue through exchanges 
among scientists from the United States and elsewhere. In short, we 
are … meeting our obligation to the full letter and spirit of the treaty, 
and we wish to work with other nations to do so as well.217
China
The best way to promote the effectiveness of the Convention 
is to conclude, through multilateral negotiation, a protocol to 
the Convention that includes a monitoring mechanism and that 
comprehensively enhances its effectiveness. Prior to concluding such a 
protocol, there is a real need to enhance the Convention’s effectiveness 
by means of promoting compliance in ways that are appropriate and 
consistent with the interests of States Parties. China supports the 
216 European Union, Statement on Behalf of the European Union, 2011, para. 7, 
<www.opbw.org/rev_cons/7rc/BWC_CONF.VII_Statement_EU_E.pdf> 
(emphasis added).
217 US Department of State, Remarks at the 7th Biological and Toxin Weapons 
Convention Review Conference, document 2011/T56-17, 7 December 2011 
(emphasis added). 
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discussion of national implementation measures in the intersession 
meetings, so as to promote the taking of practical steps by States Parties 
and further strengthen national implementation capacity-building.218
Elements of many other statements made to the various BTWC meetings 
held over the last couple of years would suggest that a peer-review 
mechanism could fulfil the requirements outlined by a number of states 
parties. In this sense a useful preliminary step could be to consult with 
capitals on past experience of peer review in other forums and, to 
paraphrase McLeish, determine whether the benefits they enjoy as a 
participant—and the information it provides—outweigh any negative 
obligations and costs.219
ADVANTAGES OF A BTWC PEER-REVIEW SYSTEM
The means whereby peer review is applied around the globe in other issue 
areas suggest the process could present a number of advantages to states 
parties in the BTWC. 
IMPROVED TRANSPARENCY AND CONFIDENCE IN THE BTWC
The peer-review process would considerably improve the existing levels 
of transparency in the BTWC not just through the provision of more 
information on the implementation of the Convention, but through 
an added-value process of “analyzing and assessing the information 
exchanged, and ensuring that any outstanding and emerging questions 
are answered”.220 In turn this provides a greater level of understanding 
of whether states parties are in compliance with obligations under the 
Convention, which in turn could help build confidence. Knowing what 
218 China, Views and Proposals on Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Biological 
Weapons Convention, 2011, <www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/
( h t t p A s s e t s ) / B 9 7 8 C 8 7 5 0 7 E 0 5 F 9 F C 1 2 5 7 9 5 1 0 0 3 C 9 9 9 5 / $ f i l e /
China+working+paper.pdf> (emphasis added).
219 C. McLeish, “Status quo or evolution: what next for the intersessional process 
of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention?”, Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientists, vol. 67, no. 3, 2011. 
220 Norway, Switzerland, and New Zealand, Working Paper on the Confidence 
Building Measures, 2011, para. 6, <www.opbw.org/rev_cons/7rc/BWC_CONF.
VII_WP_Norway-NewZealand-Switz_E.pdf>. 
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other states have in place to comply with obligations (and knowing 
whether what is in place has been independently evaluated and subjected 
to quality control) would certainly provide a clearer picture of current 
realities and could contribute to building confidence in the Convention. 
OPPORTUNITY FOR CLARIFICATION AND CONSULTATION
Related to the above point, although article V provides for a consultation 
process, its formal invocation is likely to be politically sensitive and 
exceptional and, in this regard, a peer-review system would fill a gap 
by creating an ordinary “safe space” specifically for the purposes of 
discussion, clarification, and consultation on issues of compliance (albeit 
with the positive obligations of the Convention), without invoking a 
“formal consultative meeting”.221 Thus the inclusion of a consultation and 
clarification process in a peer-review mechanism could appeal to those 
states parties that sought an opportunity to review information submitted 
by states parties and, when necessary, ask follow-up questions.222 
STRUCTURED MECHANISM FOR SHARING BEST-PRACTICE (IN SITU)
A number of states have highlighted the importance of sharing best practice 
in the implementation of aspects of the Convention—this has been one of 
the benefits of the intersessional process. Yet there are limits to the utility 
of a primarily diplomatic audience sitting in a conference room exchanging 
views on what they perceived to be best practice in biosafety or national 
legislation. This is far removed from the realities of a courtroom in the 
United Kingdom, a police department in South Africa, or a laboratory in 
Indonesia. A much better use of resources could be to share best practices 
among scientists and institutions at the national level and to examine how 
most effectively to implement those practices in situ before bringing ideas 
back to the diplomatic discussions. A peer-review model that included 
modules requiring on-site transparency visits could be particularly useful 
221 Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition 
of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) 
and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, Final Document, document 
BWC/CONF.III/23, 1991, part II, Final Declaration, art. V. 
222 See European Union, Statement on Behalf of the European Union, 2011, 
para. 7, <www.opbw.org/rev_cons/7rc/BWC_CONF.VII_Statement_EU_E.
pdf>. 
73
in removing such abstraction and result in sharing information at a much 
more concrete, applied level.
MECHANISMS FOR ENHANCING NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION
Closely linked to the above issue of sharing best practice, a peer-review 
system could also serve to highlight gaps in implementation or systemic 
problems that may not have been otherwise considered. Reports from 
IRRS follow-on visits frequently indicate that the IRRS team finds that the 
recommendations and suggestions made have been addressed, suggesting 
that host states take advantage of having issues pointed out in order to 
improve the regulatory regime. There is no reason why the same logic 
could not be applied to biotechnology and the process could therefore 
contribute to bolstering national implementation of the Convention. 
PROVIDES A FLEXIBLE AND “SCALABLE” ASSESSMENT MECHANISM
A peer-review process that built on the modular approach of the IAEA 
and focused on a performance peer review would avoid the problem of 
seeking to assess implementation against some form of prescribed one-
size-fits-all template. Instead it would seek to identify whether states could 
demonstrate having taken a number of key issues into consideration and 
develop a system that worked for them and in the conditions in which 
they operated.
POTENTIAL TO SUPPORT OUTREACH AND ENGAGEMENT
As a result of the 2005 BTWC meetings, a number of subsequent 
workshops and discussions have highlighted the importance of concepts 
such as outreach, engagement, education, awareness-raising, and adoption 
and/or development of codes of conduct. There has been a concerted 
push, primarily by non-governmental organizations and academia, to build 
awareness of the Convention and issues related to dual use among life 
scientists. However, despite a number of successes, efforts in these areas 
remain somewhat patchy and academic surveys have been met with a 
limited response from those in the life sciences. 
74
Episodes such as the recent debacle over H5N1 research223 have served 
to highlight a gulf between the scientific and security communities 
and reaffirm the importance of closer engagement. The addition of a 
stakeholder survey, as envisaged in the more ambitious peer-review 
model, could enable a more systematic approach to engagement and 
one in which the messenger would need to be taken more seriously. It is 
one thing to receive an email from an enquiring doctoral student studying 
some unfamiliar topic; it is an entirely different thing to receive an enquiry 
from the government and/or an international organization. Although there 
could well be logistical difficulties and it would take time, at the very least 
a stakeholder questionnaire could provide a clearer indication of what is 
going on and raise awareness of the existence of the Convention and the 
obligations under it of the state and force national focal points to build a 
link between the government and other relevant actors. The addition of 
a small number of transparency visits to industry and academic facilities 
could take the Convention to industry and academia. If the process of 
industry transparency visits were undertaken as a peer-review process with 
a team that included individuals with an industry background nominated 
by states, the process might be something industry actors would be more 
accustomed to and comfortable with. 
PEER PRESSURE COULD MOTIVATE STATES TO IMPROVE IMPLEMENTATION
The addition of peer pressure and public scrutiny could motivate states 
parties to act upon specific issues and to report back on progress at 
future meetings. This could be particularly potent when a credible set of 
recommendations were developed and publicized in tandem with some 
means for providing support. However, it is recognized that making the 
report publicly available may not be possible in all cases.
IT WOULD NOT REQUIRE NEW STRUCTURES
One of the advantages of a peer-review process is that there would be 
“No need for a new structure. The mechanism would be based on 
existing structures, particularly the Implementation Support Unit”.224 
223 A. Kelle, “H5N1: bungling dual-use governance”, Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientists, 29 March 2012.
224 France, A Peer Review Mechanism for the Biological Weapons Convention: 
Enhancing Confidence in National Implementation and International 
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Depending on how broadly states parties wished to apply a peer-review 
process, it would require additional resources, most logically through the 
augmentation of the ISU, and there would clearly be a need to identify a 
team of experts to conduct such reviews. Specific procedures would need 
to be developed, yet there are a number of precedents from the past that 
could be employed and procedures could be revised in light of experience 
as the peer-review mechanism evolved.
IT IS NOT VERIFICATION
One of the advantages of a peer-review system is that it is sufficiently 
detached from the historical understanding of verification that continues 
to hold sway in the BTWC, thus it may be able to avoid reigniting old 
conflicts. Peer review in the manner envisaged in both the French vision 
and Lennane’s article appears to be a conscious effort to disaggregate 
verification and look at what is “doable” in the BTWC in its current context, 
without requiring a multilaterally negotiated, legally binding mandate, but 
rather through voluntary subscription. At the same time, a peer-review 
system as envisaged here is nonetheless “A structured and systematic 
means of providing an increased level of assurance that States Parties are 
complying with the … obligations of the convention” and thus corresponds 
to part of Lennane’s understanding of verification.225 Moreover, if 
successful, it could represent a comparatively more comfortable first step 
towards strengthening the Convention through a bottom-up approach. 
DISADVANTAGES OF A PEER-REVIEW PROCESS 
There are also a number of disadvantages to a peer-review system that 
would need to be considered in order to move forward. 
REQUIRES RESOURCES AND POLITICAL WILL
Any effort to develop a peer-review system will require resources, time, 
energy, and political will. In terms of resources, financially it is worth 
Cooperation, document BWC/CONF.VII/WP.28, 13 December 2011, 
para. 10(e). 
225 R. Lennane, “Verification for the BTWC: if not the protocol, then what?”, 
Disarmament Forum, no. 1, UNIDIR, 2011, p. 41.
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recalling that the FATF annual budget for 2012 is US$ 3,371,848,226 while 
the APRM mechanism requires an annual contribution from member states 
of US$ 100,000.227 A BTWC peer-review mechanism may be able to work 
with considerably less, particularly if the small, flexible approach to BTWC 
institutional support is maintained, yet it would still require additional 
resources for implementation support as well as covering the costs of 
translations and expert reviewers’ time and travel. This would need to 
be covered by either participating states as is the case with the APRM, or 
borne by the state under review (as is the practice under the IRRS model). 
Perhaps more importantly a peer-review system would require a political 
commitment and support on the part of those states that participate. They 
would need to be sufficiently committed to both gather the necessary 
materials and then voluntarily expose themselves to scrutiny and criticisms 
of the like that they may not be accustomed to. The counter to this is 
that a number states already expose themselves to public scrutiny through 
the publication of CBMs and national compliance reports, so publishing 
an objective peer review is not a huge leap. When juxtaposed with 
a consideration of the context and an understanding of the practical 
challenges of implementation as would be envisaged in a peer-review 
report, this could actually leave states better placed to defend themselves 
against critics and to clarify any ambiguities or misplaced assumptions. 
Nonetheless the process would require political will and the establishment 
of a critical mass of diplomatic support to make the process worthwhile. 
IT IS NOT “VERIFICATION”
One of the disadvantages of a peer-review process is that there will 
undoubtedly be some states parties—and academics—who view the 
notion of voluntary peer-review as “tinkering around the edges” of what 
is required to strengthen the Convention. Certainly some states have 
been unequivocal in their views on what is necessary, and intermediate 
measures are unlikely to be acceptable to all states. For example, as the 
NAM stated at the 2012 Meeting of Experts, the “only sustainable method 
of strengthening the Convention is through multilateral negotiations aimed 
at concluding a non-discriminatory, legally binding agreement, dealing 
226 FATF, Annual Report 2011–2012, 2012, p. 38. 
227 See “Frequently asked questions”, <http://aprm-au.org/faq>. 
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with all Articles of the Convention in a balanced and comprehensive 
manner”.228
A voluntary peer-review system, even one with on-site transparency 
visits, is not going to satisfy those that remain staunchly committed to a 
“protocol-or-nothing” approach to strengthening the BTWC; nothing short 
of the unlikely resurrection of the work of the AHG as a whole is likely 
to be acceptable. However the fact that verification failed to materialize 
a decade ago should not impede other efforts to look at compliance. 
The BTWC cannot and should not wait until changes in the geostrategic 
context usher in a suitably harmonious era of peace and stability. States 
that are committed to exploring new and innovative ways to strengthen 
the Convention should be able to do what they can now. 
A BTWC PEER-REVIEW MECHANISM: MOVING FORWARD 
In Disarmament Forum it was suggested that, rather than pursue a 
multilaterally negotiated, legally binding approach to peer review, states 
parties would be better off to pursue a bottom-up approach, “developing 
and implementing individual components on a small scale, refining and 
improving them in operation, gradually expanding participation and 
scope”.229 The following is a series of steps that form one possible approach 
to developing a BTWC peer-review mechanism, beginning with a period 
of domestic information-gathering on the use of peer review in other areas, 
then proceeding through a two-phase pilot test process undertaken by a 
committed collective of states parties, and concluding with an attempt to 
expand participation and scope in time for the Preparatory Committee of 
the Eighth Review Conference.
228 Cuba (on the behalf of the NAM), Opening Statement, 16 July 2012, <www.
unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/8F2B10F714B7FD38C1257A3D0
0513BF2/$file/BWC_MSP_120716_NAM_CUBA_AM.pdf>.
229 R. Lennane, “Verification for the BTWC: if not the protocol, then what?”, 
Disarmament Forum, no. 1, UNIDIR, 2011, p. 49.
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STEPS FOR BUILDING A PEER-REVIEW PROCESS
Step 1—Preparatory work (3–5 months, contemporaneous
with step 2) 
Should states parties be keen to pursue the idea of a BTWC peer-
review mechanism, or even curious about the utility of such a concept, 
one of the most sensible first steps could be to consult domestically 
with counterparts in, and records from, other national entities, such as 
nuclear safety authorities (IRRS) or finance ministries (FATF), that have 
direct experience of participating in a peer-review process. Many BTWC 
states parties will have experience in some form of peer-review process 
and accounts of such an experience are likely to be useful in evaluating 
whether the costs outweigh the benefits in each country-specific context. 
They could also provide insights into the explicit “do” and “don’t” of a 
peer-review mechanism that could usefully be brought to the fore in 
step 2. If there are signs of interest among states parties there could be 
benefits to further research into the experiences of the OECD, the FATF, 
and the IAEA IRRS with peer-review processes at this stage to gain first-hand 
accounts of potential difficulties. This process should be relatively easily 
achieved within a few months and could occur in parallel with step two. 
Step 2—Form a collective of the committed (6 months) 
For those states parties that were particularly keen and/or have enjoyed 
sufficiently positive experiences with peer-review mechanisms in other 
issues areas to want to proceed with a BTWC mechanism, the next step 
would be to form a small group of states parties that were sufficiently 
committed to subject themselves to the scrutiny of some form of pilot 
process. In order to gain credibility among BTWC states parties and to 
mitigate any potential risk of suspicion or deliberate misrepresentation 
of the concept on the part of states parties, there would be significant 
advantages to including states parties from all key regional groups. 
However, in this early stage the collective should perhaps be kept to 
under a dozen to ensure the necessary flexibility and adaptability to 
be effective—although additional states could be given observer status. 
Practically, it would be greatly beneficial to form a small group of 
individuals from different backgrounds who could take the lead in this 
initiative and thus serve as both the champions and contact points for 
expressions of interest in such a process. In terms of timing, step 2 could 
begin with an invitation for expressions of interest by a group of states 
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parties at an intersessional meeting and conclude with a joint statement 
by the collective at a subsequent BTWC meeting. 
Step 3—Develop a plan (12 months) 
The next step would be to work within the collective to develop a 
provisional agreement on the details related to the process and scheduling 
of the peer-review mechanism, building on experiences and lessons 
learned from mechanisms in other areas. For financial reasons, much of 
the early discussion on details could be conducted through an electronic 
exchange of information and ideas, building on the experience with the 
electronic platform developed for discussion on CBMs,230 with informal 
meetings of the collective piggybacking on—and perhaps reporting to—
scheduled meetings of the BTWC intersessional process. Step 3 would 
also need to begin a process of decision-making in relation to several 
of the key prerequisites of a BTWC peer-review mechanism, such as 
identifying suitable peers, country information, criteria for assessment, 
and potential follow-up mechanisms for a pilot study. There could be 
scope for conducting further research into these areas in order to, for 
example, develop options for the criteria of assessment (particularly 
in relation to modules that remain more politically sensitive, such as 
international cooperation and assistance), or some form of questionnaire 
process designed to elicit the relevant information. A period of 12 months 
with two meetings of the collective linked to scheduled intersessional 
meetings could allow sufficient time to enable a thorough consideration 
of these issues without allowing attention to drift. 
Step 4—Conduct a first-phase pilot test (10 months)
The fourth step would build upon the discussion around processes and 
scheduling undertaken in the third step and conduct a small number of 
first-phase pilot tests of a BTWC peer-review mechanism using a small 
number of states that were willing to volunteer themselves. This could 
be developed and adapted from the model outlined above. It may also 
be useful to invite other states to serve as observers of the review process 
and both observers and participants could be encouraged to record 
not just substantive observations on the peer-review process but also 
procedural strengths and weaknesses that could be particularly important 
230 A useful example is the electronic platform used for discussion on enhancing 
the BTWC CBMs, which was developed by the Geneva Forum; see <www.
genevaforum.ch/gf/index.php?id=114>. 
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in optimizing any future activities in step 5. This could be complemented 
by additional interviews of those directly participating in the pilot process 
to build an understanding of the difficulties encountered in practice. 
A factual report of the observations and other data collected could be 
developed and aspects of the report presented to a subsequent BTWC 
meeting to maintain a link between the activities of the collective and 
those of the states parties during the intersessional process.
Step 5—Reporting back and refining (6 months)
Drawing from the reports of the pilot tests and any additional information 
available from participants and observers, it would be useful to compile 
a list of lessons learned and undergo a process of optimizing the peer-
review mechanisms and rectifying problems encountered in the first-
phase pilot study. This could result in the development and refinement 
of more detailed guidelines for a second-phase pilot test. The experience 
with first-phase pilot tests, including the results of any follow-up 
responses, and the plan for second-phase pilot tests, could be reported 
to states parties at a meeting of experts or a meeting of states parties. 
Step 6—Second-phase pilot test (10 months) 
Building on the lessons learned in the first phase and provisional 
guidelines developed in step 5, the collective could conduct a second-
phase pilot test with the intention of further optimizing the process and 
procedures. Such a process could be instilled with an additional layer 
of scrutiny through the inclusion of manufactured complications that a 
review team would need to adapt and respond to. As with the first-phase 
pilot test, it would be useful to record observations of the substance and 
process in order to improve the process in the future. 
Step 7—Expansion of participation
Towards the end of the sixth step, the collective could provide a factual 
report of the experiences in the pilot process (both positive and negative). 
In the event that an expression of interest in pursuing peer review could 
be achieved relatively soon it is possible that a provisional report of the 
two-phase pilot process could be presented at the Preparatory Committee 
in 2016 along with an invitation to states parties to join the collective 
and gradually expand participation and scope through an invitation to 
other states parties at the Preparatory Committee for the Eighth Review 
Conference to agree to peer-review evaluations. 
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The undertaking of a two-phase pilot test of a peer-review mechanism by 
a collective of states parties is unlikely to result in a perfect peer-review 
mechanism, but it would surely provide participants with a more robust 
mechanism and ensure that much of what emerges from the inevitable 
“muddling through”231 that characterizes the early evolution of policy 
processes is given sufficient attention to stand up to much greater scrutiny 
in the event that a peer-review process gathers support from a larger 
contingent of states parties.
CONCLUSIONS 
It has been remarked that the “multilateral disarmament and arms control 
community of practice is necessarily a cautious and conservative one”.232 
Unfortunately, many of the areas addressed by this community of practice 
are evolving in a manner that is considerably less circumspect. This is 
certainly the case in biotechnology, where there have been significant 
changes in both the capacity and geography of research and development 
over the last decade that have occurred in parallel with a monumental 
shift in the perceptions of threats and actors in international security. Such 
changes in both science and security make the nurturing of the Convention 
even more important in the early years of the twenty-first century. 
While it would be remiss not to acknowledge the many benefits of a 
decade of intersessional meetings, the Seventh Review Conference failed 
to meet the expectations of a number of states parties and it is questionable 
whether another round of “discussion and promotion of common 
understandings” is sufficient to tend to the health of the BTWC regime 
and sustain high-level interest in biological disarmament. This is not to 
suggest that states parties should seek a return to the protocol negotiations. 
Although developing a verification mechanism of the Convention should 
remain a long-term objective of states parties, the BTWC has moved on 
from the approach of the 1990s, and there is little value in seeking a return 
to work on the composite text, not least as it would not realistically be 
possible to pick up where states parties left off more than a decade ago. 
Moreover, if the BTWC and the prohibition on the hostile exploitation 
231 C.E. Lindblom, “The science of ‘muddling through’”, Public Administration 
Review, vol. 19, no. 2, 1959. 
232 J. Borrie and V.M. Randin (eds.), Alternative Approaches in Multilateral Decision 
Making, UNIDIR, 2005, p. 111. 
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of the life sciences it underpins is worth preserving—and the continued 
participation of states parties in the Convention suggests it is—then 
discussion on strengthening the Convention warrants more than a routine 
dialogue around a collapsed negotiation from over a decade ago.
In this regard, one logical step could be to disaggregate verification and 
look at what could feasibly and usefully be achieved without straying 
into areas that remain politically divisive. There are potentially a number 
of options that could be pursued through a process of disaggregating 
verification. One approach that could be a useful first step towards 
nurturing the Convention back to health could be to consider a systematic 
review of a state party’s implementation of the BTWC by other states 
parties, with the ultimate goal of helping the reviewed state party to adopt 
best practice and comply with the obligations of the BTWC233—in short, a 
peer-review process. 
Although at first glance such a concept may appear anomalous to the world 
of biological disarmament diplomacy, peer review is a well-established 
tool employed by several international organizations. Moreover, many 
states parties already subject themselves to peer review in areas such as 
governance in the African Union, nuclear regulation across the IAEA, and 
financial regulation through the FATF. They do so, presumably, because 
the process: 
builds transparency and confidence in the actions of others in fulfilling • 
agreed principles; 
serves as a quality-control mechanism that identifies and responds to • 
deficiencies; 
provides a flexible means of sharing lessons learned and best practice, • 
thus improving implementation of both the individual states and the 
collective; and
applies peer pressure to other states to be in compliance with agreed • 
principles.
This raises the question: if peer review is good enough for members of 
regional and international organizations such as the African Union, 
the European Union, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development, and the International Atomic Energy Agency, then 
233 See F. Pagani, Peer Review: A Tool for Co-operation and Change—An Analysis of 
an OECD Working Method, OECD document SG/LEG(2002)1, 11 September 
2002. 
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could not a peer-review mechanism be used to build confidence in the 
implementation of the Biological Weapons Convention and begin the first 
of many incremental steps towards the shared objective of strengthening 
the BTWC? 
Among a community that is inherently “cautious and conservative” 
the idea of a peer review is unlikely to gain traction in all circles. New 
and novel activities by their very nature take time to become accepted 
practices—there are, after all, few “novel norms”. Moreover, the politics of 
biological disarmament necessitate that support from some states parties is 
unlikely to be readily present for anything that is less than a multilaterally 
negotiated, legally binding verification protocol. However, this view is not 
shared by all states parties and, rather than waiting for a period of global 
peace that is sufficiently harmonious to allow a multilaterally negotiated, 
legally binding agreement on a verification protocol to be achieved, 
those states parties that wish to act collectively could use a peer-review 
mechanism to build the foundations for a compliance regime on the basis 
of what can more readily be achieved now.
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ANNEX
SUMMARY OF SELECTED PEER-REVIEW MECHANISMS
OBJECTIVES
African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM)
“[T]o foster the adoption of policies, standards and practices that lead to 
political stability, high economic growth, sustainable development and 
accelerated subregional and continental economic integration through 
experience sharing and reinforcement of successful and best practices, 
including identifying deficiencies and assessment of requirements for 
capacity building”.1
Financial Action Task Force (FATF) peer-review mechanism
To assess “whether the necessary laws, regulations or other measures 
required under the essential criteria are in force and effect, that there has 
been a full and proper implementation of all the necessary measures, and 
that the AML/CFT system as implemented is effective”.2
OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) peer review
“To monitor DAC Members’ development co-operation policies and 
programmes, and assess their effectiveness, inputs, outputs and results 
against the goals and policies agreed in the DAC as well as nationally 
established objectives.
To assist in improving individual and collective aid performance in both 
qualitative and quantitative terms.
To provide comparative reporting and credible analysis for wider publics 
in OECD countries and the international community.
To identify best practices, share experience, and foster co-ordination”.3
1 “About APRM”, <http://aprm-au.org/about-aprm>.
2 FATF, Third Round of AML/CFT Mutual Evaluations: Process and Procedures, 
2009, p. 3. 
3 “DAC information note on the peer review process for 
peer review participants”, <www.oecd.org/site/peerreview/
dacinformationnoteonthepeerreviewprocessforpeerreviewparticipants.htm>.
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IAEA Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS)
“[T]o strengthen and enhance the effectiveness of the national regulatory 
infrastructure of States for nuclear, radiation, radioactive waste and 
transport safety and security of radioactive sources whilst recognizing the 
ultimate responsibility of each State to ensure safety in the above areas”.4
European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group (ENSREG) stress tests
“[T]o assess the compliance of the stress tests with the ENSREG 
specifications, to check that no important problem has been overlooked 
and to identify strong features, weaknesses and relevant proposals to 
increase plant robustness in light of the preliminary lessons learned from 
the Fukushima disaster”.5
4 “Integrated Regulatory Review Service”, <www-ns.iaea.org/reviews/rs-
reviews.asp>.
5 ENSREG, Peer Review Report: Stress Tests Performed on European Nuclear 
Power Plants, document v12i–2012 04 25, 2012, p. 2.
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STRUCTURE
African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM)
The APRM is comprised of the Forum, which is a Committee of 
Participating Heads of State and Government of the member states of the 
African Union that have voluntarily acceded to the APRM; the Panel of 
Eminent Persons, which exercises oversight of the peer-review process with 
a view to ensuring independence, professionalism, and credibility; and the 
Secretariat, which provides technical, coordinating, and administrative 
support services to the APRM.6
Financial Action Task Force (FATF) peer-review mechanism
The FATF Plenary is the decision-making body, however this functions 
through the FATF President and the FATF Secretariat, which supports the 
task force undertaking assessments in country and supports the President.
OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) peer review
The DAC Secretariat, in consultation with the DAC, designates two of its 
members as “examiners” for each review. Examiners are supported by the 
DAC Secretariat.
IAEA Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS)
Reviews are conducted by expert peer teams, consisting of between 15 
and 25 experts7 who are selected by the IAEA from other IAEA member 
states.8 The teams include the IRRS team leader, the IRRS deputy team 
leader, the IAEA team coordinator, the IAEA deputy team coordinator, the 
IAEA review team coordinator(s), an expert reviewer, a liaison officer from 
the regulatory body of the state under review, and various counterparts 
from the regulatory body.
6 “Management structure“, <http://aprm-au.org/management-structure>. 
7 See “Integrated Regulatory Review Service mission to the United States”, 
<www.nrc.gov/public-involve/conference-symposia/irrs-mission-review.
html>. 
8 See Swedish Radiation Safety Authority, IRRS 2012: Integrated Regulatory 
Review Service at the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority, 2012.
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European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group (ENSREG) stress tests
“The peer review was managed by a Board that consisted of seven 
senior regulators from EU countries and [a European Commission] senior 
manager. Each national regulator was invited to nominate one expert for 
each of the three topical areas [natural hazards, loss of safety systems, 
and severe accident management]. Most of the experts were experienced 
regulators. Knowledgeable scientists or consultants designated by regulators 
also participated”.9
9 ENSREG, Peer Review Report: Stress Tests Performed on European Nuclear 
Power Plants, document v12i–2012 04 25, 2012, p. 2.
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LEGAL BASIS
African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM)
The APRM is based on documents that emerged from the Sixth Summit 
of the Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee of 
the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), including the 
memorandum of understanding on the APRM, which is the accession 
document for the APRM; Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic 
and Corporate Governance; the APRM base document; APRM 
Organisation and Processes; Objectives, Standards, Criteria and Indicators 
for the APRM; and Outline of the Memorandum of Understanding on 
Technical Assessments and the Country Review Visit.10
Financial Action Task Force (FATF) peer-review mechanism
The FATF has renewed its mandate in 2012, through the agreement of 
the Financial Action Task Force Mandate (2012–2020). There are no legal 
obligations per se but states do provide a “written commitment at the 
political level”.
OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) peer review
“[T]he Committee shall: 
a) monitor, assess, report, and promote the provision of resources that 
support sustainable development, as specified above, by collecting and 
analysing data and information on [official development assistance] and 
other official and private flows;
b) review development co-operation policies and practices, particularly in 
relation to national and internationally agreed objectives and targets, and 
promote mutual learning;
c) provide analysis, guidance and good practice to assist its members and 
the expanded donor community”.11
10 African Union, Guidelines for Countries to Prepare for and to Participate in the 
African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), 2003, para. 1.
11 OECD, DAC Mandate 2011–2015, document DCD/DAC(2010)34/FINAL, 
18 October 2010, p. 3.
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IAEA Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS)
“Under the terms of Article III of its Statute, the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) has the mandate to establish or adopt, in consultation 
and, where appropriate, in collaboration with competent organizations, 
standards of safety … . As part of its providing for the application of 
safety standards, the IAEA provides Safety Review and Appraisal Services, 
at the request of Member States, which are directly based on its safety 
standards”.12
European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group (ENSREG) stress tests
“The Nuclear Safety Directive requests that the EU Member States shall at 
least every 10 years arrange for periodic self-assessments of their national 
framework and competent regulatory authorities and invite an international 
peer review of relevant segments of their national framework and/or 
authorities with the aim of continuously improving nuclear safety”.13 
12 “Workshop on the Lessons Learned from Integrated Regulatory Review (IRRS) 
Missions”, <www-pub.iaea.org/iaeameetings/42169/Workshop-on-the-Lessons
-Learned-from-Integrated-Regulatory-Review-IRRS-Missions>.
13 “ENSREG and the IAEA sign a memorandum of understanding for 
International Peer Review missions in EU member states”, <www.ensreg.eu/
node/293#link1>. 
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MEMBERSHIP
African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM)
As of 2011, 30 states had voluntarily participated in the APRM: Algeria, 
Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, the Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, 
Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Mali, 
Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome and 
Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, the Sudan, Togo, Uganda, 
the United Republic of Tanzania, and Zambia.14
Financial Action Task Force (FATF) peer-review mechanism
The FATF is comprised of 34 member jurisdictions and two regional 
organizations (the European Union and the Gulf Cooperation Council). 
The jurisdictions are Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, 
China, Denmark, the European Commission, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hong Kong SAR, Iceland, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Republic 
of Korea, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, the 
Russian Federation, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States.15
OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) peer review
Members of the DAC are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Commission of the 
European Communities.16
14 See A. Shifa, African Peer Review Mechanism: Progress Update, APRM 
Secretariat, 19 May 2011, p. 6. 
15 “FATF members and observers”, <www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/aboutus/
membersandobservers>.
16 “Members and partners”, <www.oecd.org/about/membersandpartners>.
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IAEA Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS)
There are 158 member states of the IAEA.17
European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group (ENSREG) stress tests
ENSREG is comprised of senior officials from the national nuclear safety, 
radioactive waste safety, or radiation protection regulatory authorities of 
the 27 member states of the European Union, and representatives of the 
European Commission.18
17 “Member states of the IAEA”, <www.iaea.org/About/Policy/MemberStates>.
18 “European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group”, <www.ensreg.eu>.
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PROCESS
African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM)
The APRM process constitutes a base review, which is the first review 
carried out within 18 months after a state becomes a member of the 
APRM, and periodic reviews that take place every two to four years.19 The 
base review process takes 12 months and consists of five stages:
1. background research and draft plan of action;
2. country visit;
3. preparation of review team recommendations;
4. internal presentation and discussion of the recommendations; and
5. public release of the APRM report and implementation.20
Financial Action Task Force (FATF) peer-review mechanism
The review process takes six to seven months. It comprises:
1. preparatory activities (scheduling, team selection, document 
collection, etc.); 
2. on-site visits and interviews; 
3. preparation and revision of draft report;
4. submission of draft report to the Expert Review Group;21 
5. presentation of draft report to the Plenary for debate and adoption; 
and
6. publication of the report and follow-up processes.
19 “About APRM”, <http://aprm-au.org/about-aprm>.
20 See J. Cilliers, Peace and Security through Good Governance—A Guide to the 
NEPAD African Peer Review Mechanism, Occasional Paper 70, Institute for 
Security Studies, 2003. 
21 FATF, Third Round of AML/CFT Mutual Evaluations: Process and Procedures, 
2009, p. 9.
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OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) peer review
The DAC peer review comprises:
1. preparatory work by the review team and the state under review; 
2. field visits and capital visit;
3. preparation of draft report;
4. meeting with reviewed state to present findings and 
recommendations; and
5. finalization and publication of the report, and follow-up.
IAEA Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS)
The IRRS process comprises:
1. self-assessment;
2. peer review on-site including observation of regulatory activities at 
operating nuclear power plants and interviews with staff and other 
organizations to help assess effectiveness of the regulatory system; 
and
3. follow-up peer review.
European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group (ENSREG) stress tests
The ENSREG stress tests comprised:
1. assessment by and proposals for improvements from operators; 
2. review of assessment by national regulators, issuing requirements as 
appropriate; and
3. European peer review of reports submitted by national 
regulators.22
22 See ENSREG, Peer Review Report: Stress Tests Performed on European Nuclear 
Power Plants, document v12i–2012 04 25, 2012. 
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ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM)
A member state may, for its own reasons, request a review. • 
Early signs of impending political and economic crisis in a country • 
could also be sufficient cause for a review.23
The annual contribution from each member state is US$ 100,000.• 24
Civil society organizations are involved in all stages of the process. • 
Country Review Missions provide the opportunity for meetings 
between civil society organizations and the review team.25
“The truth is that a large number of countries got into NEPAD and the • 
APRM because there was a promise of support and resources”.26
Financial Action Task Force (FATF) peer-review mechanism
“[R]igorous scrutiny through mutual evaluation, public disclosure • 
and its associated peer pressure has contributed significantly to 
the development of AML/CFT regimes around the world. … The 
peer pressure associated with the ongoing mutual evaluation and 
assessments and related public scrutiny and disclosure also has the 
effect of encouraging countries not to lag behind their peers”.27
The methodology of the FATF has been characterized as “skewed • 
towards measuring legal frameworks, in minute detail and great 
length”.28
OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) peer review
Consultations are held with government officials, beneficiaries, civil society • 
representatives, and other major donors to that member under review.
Each DAC member state is peer reviewed roughly every four years.• 
23 “About APRM”, <http://aprm-au.org/about-aprm>.
24 “Frequently asked questions”, <http://aprm-au.org/faq>.
25 APRM Secretariat, 2011 APRM Annual Report, 2012, pp. 2–3.
26 South African Institute of International Affairs, APRM Lessons Learned: Report 
on the SAIIA Conference For Civil Society, Practitioners and Researchers, 2006, 
p. 30, <http://saiia.org.za/images/upload/APRM%20Lessons%20Learnt.pdf>. 
27 See N. Jensen and C.-A. Png, “Implementation of the FATF 40+9 
Recommendations: a perspective from developing countries”, Journal of 
Money Laundering Control, vol. 14, no. 2, 2011.
28 Global Witness, How FATF Can Measure and Promote an Effective Anti-Money 
Laundering System, 2012, p. 3.
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IAEA Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS)
IRRS inspection is at the request of the state. • 
Response to recommendations is voluntary.• 
The IRRS concept was developed by the IAEA’s Department of Nuclear • 
Safety and Security and then discussed at the Third Review Meeting 
of the Contracting Parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety in 
2005.29
“The strong support expressed by senior regulators for the IAEA • 
peer reviews of the nuclear regulatory framework and their concrete 
proposals for improvement will contribute significantly to the effective 
implementation of the IAEA Nuclear Safety Action Plan”.30
“There was a general recognition that these peer reviews provide • 
national nuclear regulators with an objective view of their strengths 
and weaknesses and contribute to the continuous strengthening of 
nuclear safety”.31
European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group (ENSREG) stress tests
ENSREG concluded that all countries had taken significant steps to • 
improve the safety of nuclear power plants, with varying degrees of 
practical implementation.
In spite of differences in national approaches and degrees of • 
implementation, the review showed a consistency across Europe in 
identification of strong features, weaknesses, and possible ways to 
increase plant robustness in light of the preliminary lessons learned 
from the Fukushima disaster.32
29 See “Workshop on the Lessons Learned from Integrated Regulatory Review 
(IRRS) Missions”, <www-pub.iaea.org/iaeameetings/42169/Workshop-on-
the-Lessons-Learned-from-Integrated-Regulatory-Review-IRRS-Missions>.
30 IAEA, International Nuclear Officials Discuss IAEA Peer Reviews of Nuclear 
Safety Regulations, press release 2011/22, 28 October 2011. 
31 Ibid.
32 See ENSREG, Peer Review Report: Stress Tests Performed on European Nuclear 
Power Plants, document v12i–2012 04 25, 2012, p. 3.
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ABBREVIATIONS
AHG Ad Hoc Group
AML/CFT system anti-money laundering/combating the financing of 
terrorism system
APRM African Peer Review Mechanism
BTWC Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
CBMs confidence-building measures 
CSTO Collective Security Treaty Organization 
DAC  OECD Development Assistance Committee
ENSREG European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group
ERG FATF Expert Review Group
FATF  Financial Action Task Force
IAEA  International Atomic Energy Agency
IRRS  IAEA Integrated Regulatory Review Service
ISU Implementation Support Unit
MER FATF Mutual Evaluation Report
NAM  Non-Aligned Movement
NEPAD New Partnership for Africa’s Development
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development
OHSAS Occupational Health and Safety Assessment Series
SAI Standing Agenda Item
